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History

The Fryingpan-Arkansas Project: A Political, Economic and Environmental History
Chairperson: Dan Flores

The Fryingpan-Arkansas Project (FAP) collects water from Colorado’s West Slope and
transports it through the Rocky Mountains, via tunnel, to Colorado’s East Slope to meet
the demands o f farmers, industries and cities along the Arkansas River. Transmountain
water projects are found predominantly in Colorado. As such, they have not been
thoroughly addressed in the water historiography. This study examines the political,
economic, and environmental impacts o f this unique project.
Politically, the history of the FAP is unique because of the rift that occurred within
Colorado itself. Citizens in Colorado’s Western Slope feared that the removal o f water
from their region would negatively impact their economic potential. Other concerns on
the national level included the national surplus of agricultural products, concern over who
would pay for the project, and the impact it would have on the environment. Congress
approved the FAP in response to fears over a long-standing drought, in order to support
defense industries located in the Arkansas Valley, and after feuding communities within
Colorado overcame a number of differences, including the construction of a large
reservoir for Western Slope use.
The costs o f the FAP were to be bome by irrigators, municipalities and industries,
proportionately. But who has actually paid for the costs of the Project up to this point
and who has received the water? It has become clear in the years following the FAP’s
construction that the project’s costs and benefits are unequally distributed. The FAP’s
operating principles guarantee cities and industries a minimum amount of FAP water.
However, up until the last couple of years, agricultural interests along the Arkansas
Valley in Eastern Colorado have received most of it. Yet citizens in Colorado Springs
and other cities continue to pay the bulk of the FAP’s costs. American taxpayers, at
large, provide additional subsidies to cover these costs.
Finally, what has become o f the rivers, riparian habitat and wildlife impacted by the
FAP? I conclude that the project amplifies salinity, temperature and water-flow
problems in the Colorado and Arkansas River basins, which, in turn, negatively impact
agricultural users, fish and the habitats alongside FAP rivers and facilities.
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Introduction
A raindrop falls from the skies above central Colorado and joins a trickle of water
running down the west face o f Hagerman Pass on the Continental Divide. This trickle
meanders around gray, lichen coated boulders and beads over a bed of quartz-speckled
granite. It joins other small trickles to form larger rivulets that sink ever lower in
elevation before combining with other rivulets large enough to form a stream. Water
soon pours into this stream from every direction. The stream becomes a river—the
Fryingpan River. But the molecules o f that first raindrop do not enjoy the same journey
they may have prior to the 1960s, when they would have continued down the Fryingpan
River to the Roaring Fork River and, eventually, to the Colorado River in its journey
through Utah, Arizona and California. This raindrop will, instead, travel underneath the
Continental Divide, and pass through at least five reservoirs and dams and one
hydroelectric power-plant as it joins the eastward flowing Arkansas River, which
proceeds through Kansas, Oklahoma and Arkansas, before finally giving itself to the
Mississippi and the Gulf o f Mexico.
Various raindrops from a single storm may travel the combined 27.2 miles of
tunnels that catch rainwater and snowmelt from Colorado’s Western Slope and sweep it
under the Continental Divide through the 5.4-mile Charles H. Boustead Tunnel to the
Eastern Slope. This “transmountain” water diversion is part of the Bureau of
Reclamation’s complex Fryingpan-Arkansas Project (FAP). It has the potential to bring
over 69,000 acre-feet of water every year to meet the demands of irrigators, industries
and cities.^

' The term “transmountain” generally refers to the transfer o f water across the Continental Divide. Another
term, more commonly used, is “inter-basin,” which refers to long-distance transfers o f water, not
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The Fryingpan-Arkansas Project’s Boustead Tunnel is one o f thirty-seven such
transmountain diversion structures in Colorado. It is the state’s second largest, smaller
only than the primary diversion tunnel o f the Colorado-Big Thompson Project, an
elaborate reclamation project that brings more than 230,000 acre- feet of water to various
cities, including Denver, and to irrigators in the northeast section of the state.
Transmountain diversions provide much-needed water to eastern Colorado, which holds
more than 90% of the state’s population, but receives less than 20% o f the state’s
precipitation.^
I grew up in Colorado Springs, along Colorado’s Eastern Slope—or the “Front
Range.” It is one o f the municipalities that benefits from the Fryingpan-Arkansas
Project. Since Colorado Springs borders the farming conununities o f Eastern Colorado, I
often heard about the hardships faced by small farmers in this portion of the state but only
vaguely connected it with the flow o f water out of the mountains, onto the plains and
across farmers’ fields.
I also grew up near the headwaters region o f the Arkansas River. My family
owned a small half-acre o f land in a subdivision near these headwaters which we would
visit often to sit on lawn chairs, roast hotdogs and dream o f someday building a log cabin.
I would watch the Arkansas wind down the valley each time we drove to and from that
plot of land and I would ache to raft down it or fly-fish in it during the summers. My
necessarily from one side o f the Continental Divide to the other. Department o f the Interior, Bureau o f
Reclamation, Final Environm ental Statement: Fryingpan-Arkansas Project, Colorado (Denver, 1975), ii;
Senate Subcommittee on Irrigation and Reclamation, H earing Before the Subcommittee on Irrigation and
Reclamation o f the Com m ittee on Interior and Insular Affairs on S. 284: A Bill to Authorize the
Construction, Operation, and M aintenance by the Secretary o f the Interior o f the Fryingpan-Arkansas
Project, C olorado, 87'*’ Cong., 2d sess., 1962, 6.
^ Ellen Wohl, Virtual Rivers: Lessons from the Mountain Rivers o f the Colorado Front Range (N ew Haven:
Yale University Press, 2001), 111-3; Daniel Tyler, The L ast Water H ole In the West: The Colorado-Big
Thompson P roject and the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy D istrict (Niwot, CO: University Press
o f Colorado, 1992), 3.
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family and I frequently fished in and played in many the state’s rivers and reservoirs,
among them, Turquoise Reservoir, Twin Lakes and Pueblo Reservoir—all reservoirs
created by or changed significantly by the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project. I was connected
to this River and this Project in countless ways. However, at the time, I did not
understand its importance to millions of Coloradoans; nor did I understand that the
Arkansas was a river touched not only by the hands o f God and nature but also very
significantly by the hands of men and women.

Statement of the Problem
Conflicts over water rights in the American West are as heated today as ever
before. A prolonged drought in this region over the last six years has drawn national
attention. Proposals for water transfers, dam and reservoir enlargements, and new
development projects spring up in the news constantly.
The reservoirs in the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project have a total storage capacity of
748,581 acre-feet. An acre-foot o f water is the volume o f water that will cover an area of
one acre to a depth o f one foot. The project has eighteen diversion structures and ten
tunnels; it utilizes approximately 38,000 acres o f land to house its facilities and to serve
project-related purposes. The FAP built four new reservoirs, including Ruedi, Forebay,
Clear Creek, and Pueblo; it expanded two others. Twin Lakes and Turquoise. It also
includes the Mt. Elbert Pumped Storage Powerplant, located on the north shore o f Twin
Lakes Reservoir, which is capable o f producing 200,000 kilowatts of electrical power. ^
The FAP is unique compared to many other development projects in the West
because of its transmountain water diversion feature. To Eastern Slope Coloradoans like
Bureau o f Reclamation, Final EIS, ii, II-8.
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myself, this type o f diversion makes sense—water should be used by those who have a
need. We have that need. But transmountain diversions do not come without costs. The
approval, construction and operation of the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project created political,
economic and environmental consequences that have not been thoroughly examined. In
this thesis I will examine these three aspects o f the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project. In
Chapter One, I examine the politic battle over the FAP. In Chapter Two, I discuss the
economic costs and benefits of the FAP. Finally, in Chapter Three, I analyze the impact
the FAP had and is having on the rivers and habitats surrounding the project’s rivers and
facilities. As I proceed, I will answer several important questions.
Politically, the FAP exacerbated tensions between needy, fast-developing Eastern
Slope residents and the water-blessed, rural Western Slope residents who felt—and still
feel— that they are being robbed o f their natural resources and economic potential.
Disputes between states over water resources are a common feature in the history of
numerous reclamation projects, but the FAP is unique because of this intra-state rift.
Why was the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project so controversial within Colorado? More
broadly speaking, what kind of opposition did the Project attract from Americans nation
wide? Finally, what is the broader historical context in which the debate occurred?
Economically speaking, the FAP cost an enormous amount of money, and its
costs were to be bome by irrigators, municipalities and industries, proportionately. But
who has actually paid for the costs of the Project up to this point and who has received
the water? Has the average American taxpayer—as historians Donald Worster and Marc
Reisner assert has been the case in similar projects across the West—been suckered into
paying for this large and expensive project that subsidizes large agribusinesses and leaves
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them holding few, if any, benefits? Which interests benefited from the FAP and which
ones suffered?
Finally, altered by such an incredible web o f collection stations, tunnels, dams,
reservoirs, and pumps, what has become o f the rivers whose waters have been augmented
or diminished? What about the habitats around the rivers, reservoirs and tunnels? How
have fish and wildlife been impacted? What is the potential harm or benefit in the
coming years to the environment as a result o f the FAP?
In Chapter One, I argue that many o f the known costs and benefits of the FAP
were understood and accepted by a majority of Coloradoans by the time of authorization.
The nation, at large, remained skeptical about the project, and the debate brought to
public attention many o f the costs associated with reclamation in the West, including
agricultural surpluses, vague and complicated repayment contracts, and environmental
consequences. In examining the debate, it is possible to see the emergence of the modem
environmental movement and its struggle to move away from its focus on preserving
National Parks and towards a focus on general environmental concerns. Congress
debated the FAP for nine years— 1953-1962— and it was only through adept political
maneuvering and compromises that Congressmen J. Edgar Chenowith and Wayne
Aspinall finally obtained approval for the project. As for the East/West Slope water
allocation debate, although the two sides compromised over the authorization of the FAP,
they remained and continue to remain bitterly divided over the future of transmountain
diversions in the state.
Chapter Two is an economic analysis of the costs and benefits of the FryingpanArkansas Project. At the time of passage, the FAP was touted as a different kind of
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reclamation project. Cities and industries were guaranteed at least fifty-one percent o f
the water made available by FAP facilities. Agricultural users could use the remainder of
the water to mitigate crop losses during dry years. Repayment would be bome
proportionately by the entities using the water and federal subsidies would remain
minimal. The Fryingpan-Arkansas Project’s actual costs, repayment, and distribution of
benefits, however, did not match up with the project planners’ expectations. Up until the
last couple o f years, agricultural users received the majority of the benefits of the FAP,
while subsidies bome by Colorado residents and the U.S. population at large paid for the
construction and maintenance of the Project’s facilities. Furthermore, the amount of
water delivered by FAP facilities has been disappointing, and so has the electricity that
the FAP’s hydroelectric features were supposed to provide.
Finally, in Chapter Three, I argue that the FAP has had negative consequences—
both anticipated and unanticipated—to the environment. The FAP has exacerbated
salinity problems in the Colorado and Arkansas River basins, to the detriment of farmers,
fish and other aquatic organisms, and the wildlife and habitats surrounding FAP rivers
and facilities. The FAP has also dramatically changed water flows and water
temperatures, to the detriment of these same entities. Improved management o f FAP
facilities and river flows since 1990 have alleviated some o f these environment concerns.
However, on the whole, the FAP has proven to be substantially destructive on its
surrounding environment.
My aim in this thesis is not to develop a broader interpretation of water
development in the West. Rather, my goal is to analyze the importance o f the FryingpanArkansas Project and to measure its costs and benefits to the citizens of Colorado and the
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United States as a whole. Droughts have plagued the West in the last couple o f years,
while populations in the region have increased dramatically. By understanding the costs
and benefits o f this and other past projects, we will be better prepared to determine the
potential for similar projects in the future.

Review of the Literature
From the very beginning, two books have shaped the direction of this thesis:
Donald Worster’s Rivers o f Empire: Water Aridity, and the Growth o f the American West
and Donald Pisani’s To Reclaim A Divided West. As the project proceeded, a number of
other texts stood out as particularly relevant to the analysis o f the Fryingpan-Arkansas
Project. They include: Marc Reisner's Cadillac Desert, Daniel Tyler’s The Last Water
Hole In the West: The Colorado-Big Thompson Project and the Northern Colorado
Water Conservancy District, Charles Howe and K. William Easter’s Interbasin Transfers
o f Water: Economic Issues and Impacts, and Ellen W ohl’s Virtual Rivers: Lessons from
the Mountain Rivers o f the Colorado Front Range.
Donald Worster argues that irrigation and water development in the West
undermined American democracy. In Rivers o f Empire, published in 1985, Worster
builds on the work of German scholar Karl Wittfogel, who maintained that, historically,
large-scale irrigation societies always became hierarchical and autocratic. During the
initial stages o f irrigation development, managerial elites emerged, who recognized the
potential wealth of irrigation and monopolized the society’s technical knowledge. These
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elites created “corvées,” or “hydraulic armies,” to build and maintain their irrigation
systems.'^
The American West, Worster continues, emerged as a new kind of hydraulic
society, and he divides its development into three stages: incipience, florescence and
empire. The incipient stage consisted of individual and local irrigation efforts during the
initial settlement stages o f the West. The passage o f the 1902 National Reclamation Act
marked the beginning o f “fluorescence,” when the federal government monopolized
capital and engineering expertise necessary for major irrigation projects. Corporate
entities during this period became the prime benefactors o f government-subsidized water
and grew wealthy even as class-structures grew more stratified. Finally, after 1940, the
American West—and more specifically, California, one o f the great agricultural centers
o f the world thanks to irrigation—became the seat o f an American empire. The U.S.
Government and private wealth created a powerful alliance, determined in its quest for
complete domination o f the nation’s rivers, and utilizing migrant agricultural wagelaborers as its corvee.^
Donald Pisani, in To Reclaim a Divided West, refutes Worster’s concept of a
Western “empire.” He maintains that the federal government adopted a fi’agmented water
policy that reacted specifically to each distinct regional economy, culture, institutional
network and environment in the United States. The failure o f the Reclamation Act of
1902—a uniform national policy designed to encompass and reconcile competing
regional and state interests—proved the extent to which those interests were, themselves.

^ Donald Worster, Rivers o f Empire: Water, Aridity, and the Growth o f the American West (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1985) 6-7, 14-5, 20, 23, 27, 38, 41.
^ Ibid., 51-2, 64, 171, 1 9 3 ,2 1 7 284.
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inherently fragmented.^ Pisani’s stance on the degree to which water development
impacted individual democracy is more difficult to distinguish. Although each
community wrangled with others for government resources, the federal government did
its best to accommodate each one individually. If water projects undermined liberty and
democratic ideals, the government did not act toward that end purposefully.
Donald Pisani continues his examination o f water policy with Water and
American Government: The Reclamation Bureau, National Water Policy, and the West,
1902-1935. Many historians, he argues—no doubt addressing Worster—incorrectly view
federal reclamation as a feature of modem America: “It makes more sense to see the
Reclamation Act o f 1902 and the events that followed as evidence of the persistence o f
‘frontier America’ and traditional nineteenth-century values.” It reflected the nineteenthcentury laissez-faire ideal o f individual autonomy rather than the modem “ethic of a
rationalized, planned economy.” Pisani maintains that water interests in this era
continued to be “fragmented” as interest groups, politicians and the Interior Department
fought for control o f the Reclamation Bureau’s direction.^
My own interpretation of the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project leans heavily towards
Pisani’s interpretation o f water development in the West. Coloradoans understood many
o f the costs and benefits of the FAP, and believed that the benefits outweighed the costs.
The Bureau o f Reclamation appears to be a party willing to play along with whatever
project Coloradoans would give them. It appears as a pawn, fragmented in its policies.

^ Donald J. Pisani, To Reclaim a D ivided West: Water, Law, and Public Policy, 1848-1902 (Albuquerque:
University o f N ew M exico Press, 1992), xiii-xvii.
^ Donald J. Pisani, Water and American Government: The Reclamation Bureau, National Water Policy,
and the West, 1902-1935 (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 2002), xi-xvii.
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and tom between communities, interest groups, politicians and the Department o f the
Interior. It is not, as Worster suggests, an agency o f empire. ®
Mark Reisner’s 1986 book, Cadillac Desert, on the other hand, leans toward
Donald Worster’s interpretation. Reclamation in the American West, he argues,
benefited a handful—more often agribusinesses than not—while millions of taxpayers
continue to pay the bill. Dams and water projects throughout the West wreaked havoc on
the environment and local cultures. The Bureau o f Reclamation and Army Corps of
Engineers rarely justified the expense of projects in light o f their dismal returns, and
often these two agencies created projects just to compete with each other, or simply to
justify their continued existence and keep their engineers busy. Power and money play a
dominant role in Reisner’s interpretation of Western water development and, he warns,
past excesses threaten the prosperity of the region in the future.^ Reisner’s account is
both comprehensive and terrifically engaging. It proved invaluable in providing a
broader picture of water development in the West and a detailed analysis of how
reclamation projects in the West were funded.
Also influential to this thesis was Daniel Tyler’s The Last Water Hole In the
West: The Colorado-Big Thompson Project and the Northern Colorado Water
Conservancy District. In this book, Tyler examines the political history behind
Colorado’s largest transmountain water project, the Colorado-Big Thompson Project. He
explores the pressures placed on the Northern Colorado Conservancy District—the entity
responsible for repayment and management o f the Project—by federal legislation, water
developers and environmentalists, and discusses the changes that resulted. The water
* Tyler,
Water H ole, 1-5,
^ Marc Reisner, C adillac Desert: The American West and Its D isappearing Water, Revised and Updated
(New York: Penguin Books, 1993).
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community’s often “unreasonable and stubborn” adherence to the doctrine of prior
appropriation, he argues, clashed with environmentalists’ “tendencies to neglect the
social and economic value o f water storage and the importance of private property right
to those possessing legitimate water decrees.” Compromise and negotiation resulted in
slow but gradual progress. However, transmountain water diversions, he continues,
threaten West Slope development opportunities, raise environmental concerns—
particularly with regard to river salinity—and create political and legal difficulties with
lower basin states and Mexico. These conclusions proved invaluable in helping me shape
my own conclusions on the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project.
Charles Howe and K. William Easter, in Interbasin Transfers o f Water: Economic
Issues and Impacts, published in 1971, account for many o f the costs left out o f costbenefit ratios during the early years of funding reclamation projects in the West. Their
work, since being published, has been referenced in nearly every analysis o f reclamation,
and it proved no less valuable in my economic analysis o f the FAP.
Finally, Ellen W ohl’s Virtual Rivers: Lessons from the Mountain Rivers o f the
Colorado Front Range, proved an excellent study of the environmental impact o f dams
and other human-induced changes on several Colorado rivers. While it did not directly
analyze the impact of the FAP on the Arkansas and Colorado Rivers, it proved a valuable
model by which to proceed with my own discussion.

A Note on the Primary Sources
In addition to these secondary sources, numerous primary sources proved
valuable for this thesis. I used the papers of J. Edgar Chenowith and Wayne Aspinall

11
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

extensively, especially when considering Congress’s approval of the FAP in Chapter
One. Stories from the Colorado Springs Gazette, Pueblo Chieftain, Denver Post, and
other Colorado newspapers provided much in the way o f background information and
insight into Coloradoans’ support or opposition to the FAP. I interviewed numerous
officials from Colorado Springs Utilities, the Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy
District, the U.S. Geological Survey and the Bureau o f Reclamation. Their knowledge
and openness added considerable depth to this thesis. DuVoid Burris’s interviews with J.
Edgar Chenowith and numerous other influential supporters o f the FAP, recorded in
Fourteen Statements: History o f the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project and Southeastern
Colorado Water Conservancy District, also proved its usefulness on numerous occasions.
Finally, I read countless government documents during my research, including the
Bureau of Reclamation’s Final Environmental Impact Statement, and reports on
everything from archeological investigations to the FAP’s impact on fish in the Colorado
and Arkansas river basins.
The Fryingpan-Arkansas Project has left quite an impression on Colorado’s
community since the early 1950s. During my research I have discussed the project with
Coloradoans in archives, libraries, university hallways, coffee shops and countless other
locations. During these discussions I was always struck by the fact that everybody
regarded the FAP as an important issue of our present, and not just an interesting feature
of our past. That the FAP continues to be a relevant and salient issue in our present has
bolstered my belief that this study is an important one. Recent proposals to expand FAP
facilities provide further proof that the issue is not dead, but very much alive.

12
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Chapter One
The Politics of Passage
Congressman J. Edgar Chenowith of Colorado fought ten long years for the
Fryingpan-Arkansas Project before seeing it approved by the House o f Representatives in
1962. Chenowith first introduced the FAP in 1953, in a form very different from the one
Congress finally approved. The project’s proponents included cities, developers,
industries and, of course, agricultural interests. States in the lower Colorado River basin
such as California and Arizona criticized the project during this entire period, but the
greatest opposition came from within Colorado itself. West Slope residents—those
residing west of the Continental Divide—viewed the transmountain diversion as a threat
to their resources and to their potential for growth and economic expansion. Enough
opposition parties worked out their differences by 1962 to allow the passage of the FAP,
but a handful of minority parties continued in their efforts to undermine passage o f the
bill until the very end.
Chenowith introduced the Fryingpan Arkansas Project at a time when Congress,
interest groups, and average Americans increasingly questioned the practical uses and
costs of reclamation projects. It was during these years that the leaders of the modem
day environmental movement began to speak out on reclamation issues with increasing
frequency and tenacity. The Sierra Club, the Isaac Walton League, and the Wilderness
Society, as well as numerous other outdoor enthusiasts, voiced their opinions with
increasing urgency in such resource development debates as this one. However, Cold
War concerns also plagued the minds of the country’s leaders, and Congressmen worried
about meeting the needs o f thirsty steel and energy industries. Also, a severe drought
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desiccated the West in the mid-1950s, reminding everyone of the horrible conditions of
the Dustbowl and convincing Congressmen and Coloradoans that every last drop of water
should be developed no matter what the cost.
It is within this context that the political battle over the Fryingpan-Arkansas
Project occurred. By battle, 1 mean the struggle between local interests and between
national interests. The citizens of Colorado helped shape the FAP from the very
beginning. Eastern farmers lobbied to obtain supplemental water for their crops, while
municipalities agonized over meeting the needs o f their booming populations.
Meanwhile, the residents of towns like Aspen fought to retain control over their local
resources and citizens o f Grand Junction and Glenwood Springs wondered why they
should have to pay for projects that used “their” water but benefited parties hundreds of
miles away. The FAP impacted local communities and the environment considerably—
as subsequent chapters will show— enough to restrict or prohibit the passage of similar
projects in the future.

Background: The Reclamation Act of 1902
In 1911 William E. Smythe wrote:
To proceed in the making of your farm, in the development of a great region, in
the formation o f institutions, by knowledge rather than by chance, is a profoundly
religious thing. Irrigation, for example, is a religious right. Such a prayer for rain
is intelligent, scientific, worthy o f man’s divinity. And it is answered. To put
knowledge in place o f superstition is the first step which men take in entering into
partnership with God.
For Smythe, one of the most outspoken devotees to the cause o f federally managed
reclamation, the Reclamation Act of 1902 was “the most shining guidepost thus far
erected by the genius o f our statesmanship.” But Smythe believed that reclamation meant
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more than just the fulfillment o f the nation’s religious obligation. He believed that
irrigation would give average Americans the land and autonomy God intended. A dyed
in the wool Progressive reformer, Smythe was convinced that the Reclamation Act as a
tool for social development and means for promoting democratic values. *
The Reclamation Act of 1902 states that funds from the sale of lands in Western
states are to be placed in a “’reclamation fund’ to be used in the examination and survey
for and the construction and maintenance of irrigation works for the storage, diversion,
and development o f waters for the reclamation of arid and semiarid lands.” The Act
limited the size of reclaimed plots to 160-acres, allowed owners ten years to repay
construction costs, and required that owners be a “bona fide resident on such land.” ^
Certainly many Americans shared in Smythe’s idealistic vision. But others had
more practical concerns. Donald Pisani argues that the Reclamation Act was a response
to a number o f historical factors: the depressions o f 1893, American nationalism, fear of
the influence o f millions of new immigrants of “questionable” character, questions over
the legitimacy and benefits of imperialism (after the Spanish-American War), rapid
population growth and urbanization, anxiety over the future o f the rural United States, the
increasing power o f industry and labor, fear o f monopoly, the growing strength o f the
Western states in Congress, the desire of railroads to sell accumulated lands, and the rise
o f two influential politicians: Francis G. Newlands and Theodore Roosevelt.^
The Reclamation Act arose as a response to the failures of private companies and
individual states to achieve their irrigation goals. However, Pisani notes that the Act had
’ William Smythe, The Conquest o f A rid America (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1911),
xii,xxi, 43, 330.
^ Public Law 161, 57“’ Cong., P* sess. (17 June, 1902).
^ Donald J. Pisani, To Reclaim a D ivided West: Water, Law, and Public Policy, 1848-19Q2 (Albuquerque:
University o f N ew M exico Press, 1992), 273, 291, 298.
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many problems of its own and calls it “one o f the most anomalous laws ever passed by
Congress.” It
...promised to unify the West, but it also reflected many political and economic
divisions within the region. It held out the hope o f centralizing control over land
and water, but it perpetuated nineteenth century concepts of limited government.
It embodied twentieth-century ideals o f rational planning, efficiency, and
government by experts, but it also constituted a bundle of compromises that
inevitably undermined those ideals.
Concerns that plagued the passage o f the Act from the beginning included its
constitutionality, the potential for reclamation expenditures to greatly exceed budgets, the
diverse nature and inadequacy of state water laws, the potential for interstate conflicts
and agricultural surpluses o f certain staple crops. But lobbyists, including Smythe,
Newlands and Roosevelt, pursuaded Congressmen to overlook these concerns.
Congressmen also overlooked the disasters o f previous land-grant policies, according to
Pisani. The federal government intervened repeatedly in the past to bail out failed
farmers. The Reclamation Act in its turn gave no clear instructions on how the
government should deal with defaulting irrigators. Nor did it provide for any kind of
uniform policy throughout the West. Most Westerners, Pisani observes, “saw it mainly
as a benefits program, a way to stimulate local economic development.” Each state
grabbed whatever it could as often as it could. The wording of the 1902 Act
“institutionalized” fragmentation across the West, and denied the federal government the
ability to regulate reclamation. Some local communities benefited from the projects
created by the Act, but continuous friction between federal and local interests destroyed
the Progressive Era’s drive toward rational planning and efficiency in the arena of water

Pisani, To Reclaim, 273.
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development. ^
Donald Worster is much more critical about the outcome of the Reclamation Act.
He argues that the passage o f the 1902 Act created three unanticipated consequences:
“Those who would reap the benefits were a much smaller number than anyone had
supposed; they had to be organized into tight hierarchical and corporate entities which
violated traditional rural culture; and the bureaucracy administering the program had to
become adept at social as well as environmental engineering.” The Reclamation
Service— or, Reclamation Bureau, after 1907— quickly monopolized engineering
expertise, creating “a position of technical hegemony in western water development.”
This pattern of technical monopolization fit the pattern created by so many previous
irrigation societies and the result would be the same: the undermining of democratic
values, the proliferation o f social injustice, a widening between rich and poor, and the
destruction of the environment. After WWII the Bureau partnered more aggressively
with wealthy elites out West to exploit nearly every river in the West for their own
financial gain. ^
But Pisani criticizes Donald Worster’s interpretation as a simplified and
presentistic “morality play.” Pulling no punches, Pisani writes:
With few exceptions, [Worster’s] “players” are one-dimensional: fools, innocents,
and victims pitted against self-serving technocrats, politicians, and predatory
capitalists. Occasionally a hero, such as Powell, struts across the stage, but
believable men— let alone good ones—are hard to find. However satisfying this
view is to many modem readers who are disenchanted with American society, it
ignores the context of reclamation: local political and economic conditions, the
legal structure, the depression o f 1893, the Populist movement, and many other
forces that impeded planning and coordinated action.^
^ Ibid., 317, 322-5, 333-6.
®Donald Worster, Rivers o f Empire: Water, Aridity, and the Growth o f the American West (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1985), 11, 14, 64, 170-1.
’ Pisani, To Reclaim , 332.
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Although Pisani and Worster may disagree about the inevitable results of the
Reclamation Act, both agree it failed to achieve the results its original planners intended.
Between 1902 and 1962, when the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project finally passed
through Congress, the Reclamation Act underwent numerous changes. The 1902 Act
required irrigators who benefited from reclamation projects to repay their share of facility
costs within ten years o f their completion. Congress extended these payment obligations
in 1914, 1926 and again in 1939. Under the Reclamation Project Act of 1939 irrigators
had 50 years to pay their share of reclamation costs. In 1924 the Fact Finders Act
authorized the Bureau of Reclamation to base repayment obligations on ability to pay—a
concept it turned to time and time again during and after the 1930s. Lawrence
MacDonnell, a professor from the Natural Resources Law Center at the University of
Colorado School o f Law writes:
Conceived initially as a means of facilitating the supply o f irrigation water, the
purposes of the reclamation program have been greatly expanded over the years.
The federal interest in receiving reimbursement for the cost o f these facilities has
been outweighed by the politically stronger interest in subsidizing the settlement
and development o f the West. ®
The Reclamation Act changed in other important ways. Most significantly,
reclamation projects became multipurpose facilities. In addition to providing irrigation
benefits, they might provide hydroelectric, fish and wildlife, navigation and flood control
benefits, and supply municipalities and industries with needed water. The 1928 Boulder
Canyon Project Act became the first multipurpose Bureau o f Reclamation project and the
1939 Reclamation Project Act directed the Secretary o f the Interior to consider the
* Lawrence MacDonnell, Richard W. Wahl, and Bruce C. Driver, “Facilitating Voluntary Transfers o f
Bureau o f Reclamation-Supplied Water, Volume I” (Boulder, CO: Natural Resources Law Center, 1991),
9, 11.
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multipurpose potential of all new projects.^

History of Water Law artd Development in Colorado
Colorado’s documented water history dates back to the years prior to its
acquisition by the United States in the Treaty o f Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848. Hispanic
farmers had long irrigated their lands in Southwestern Colorado at the headwaters of the
Rio Grande before this Treaty. But the Colorado Gold Rush of the 1850s exerted new
pressures on water resources. Fighting occurred among miners and among farmers, as
well as between the two groups. Irrigators built the first two registered ditches along the
Arkansas Valley in 1860. In 1861 farmers built the Arkansas Valley Ditch, a cooperative
effort downstream from Pueblo that transported Arkansas River water eleven miles and
helped to irrigate 4,000 acres. By 1884 irrigators had built 191 ditches in this valley.
Importantly, a full 93 percent of all irrigated lands lay on the East Slope; only seven
percent lay on the West Slope. Already by 1890, however, the Arkansas River was overappropriated.
Water hungry Coloradoans quickly realized that the riparian system of water
rights adhered to throughout the rest of the nation would not adequately meet their needs.
Under the riparian system, the owner o f a property bordering or surrounding a body of
water maintains certain rights, including, the right to flow, access, fish, prevent erosion,
and the right to reasonable use as long as other users remain uninjured. Such a property
owner generally retains these rights whether they use them or not. Under such a system.
^ Ibid., 9; also see the 1946 Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act.
E.S. Nettleton, Report o f the State Engineer to the Governor o f Colorado, 1883-1884 (Denver, CO;
Collier and Cleaveland Lith. Co., 1885), 19; Donald Barnard Cole, “Transmountain Water Diversions in
Colorado,” The Colorado M agazine 25, no. 2, (March 1948): 54, 58, 61; Ralph Taylor, “Arkansas Valley
Water Problems 100 years Old,” Pueblo Star-Journal and Sunday Chieftain, 2 January 1955.
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upstream mining and agriculture interests adjacent to rivers claimed water rights early in
the territory’s settlement. Because water is scarcer in the West than in the East where
this system prevailed, these interests restricted further settlement downstream o f these
areas. *^
Coloradoans, instead, adopted the doctrine o f prior appropriation—also known as
the “Colorado Doctrine.” Under this system, senior users maintain priority rights to
water over junior users— first in time, first in right. In the event o f a water shortage, the
senior rights holder receives his full allowance o f water before the junior holder can
squeeze out a single drop. Water users under this doctrine do not own the water, but the
right to use that water. These rights can be bought, sold, and taxed as real property. To
establish a right, users must make an attempt to physically divert and/or use the water,
and this water must be put to “beneficial use.” An action such as staking a head gate or
surveying a diversion ditch marks the date o f appropriation. In the 1876 Colorado
Constitution, the state officially endorsed this doctrine. The Constitution states:
The right to divert the unappropriated waters o f any natural stream to beneficial
uses shall never be denied. Priority of appropriation shall give the better right as
between those using the water for the same purpose; but when the waters of any
natural stream are not sufficient for the service o f all those desiring the use of the
same, those using the water for domestic purposes shall have the preference over
those claiming for any other purpose, and those using the water for agricultural
purposes shall have preference over those using the same for manufacturing
purposes.

Furthermore:
The water o f every natural stream, not heretofore appropriated, within the state of
Colorado, is hereby declared to be the property o f the public, and the same is
dedicated to the use o f the people of the state, subject to appropriation as
'* Joseph L. Sax, Water Law: C ases and Commentary, Preliminary Ed. (Boulder, CO: Pruett Press, Inc.,
1965), 7-9; Herbert C. Young, Understanding Water Rights and Conflicts, 2d. ed. (Denver: Burg Young
Publishing, LLC, 2003), 71-3.
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hereinafter provided.
Under this phrasing, the state may authorize the transport o f water anywhere in Colorado
as long as it is economically feasible and does not interfere with the rights held by senior
users.
In 1882 the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the legal precedent for inter
basin— including transmountain—water diversions and storage projects in Coffin v. Left
Hand Ditch Company when it ruled that neither riparian nor watershed location mattered
under the prior appropriation doctrine. Then, the 1922 Colorado River Compact
apportioned the water in the Colorado River equally to the upper and lower basin states.
Each state increased water development efforts in order to secure appropriation rights.
Support grew for transmountain water diversions in Colorado that would bring needed
water eastward where the majority of the state’s population lived.
Small transmountain water diversions sprang up intermittently between 1890 and
1930 along the South Platte, Arkansas, Gunnison and Rio Grande Rivers. The primary
purpose of such diversions was to provide East Slope residents with West Slope water.
In the 1930s, Colorado constructed three larger transmountain diversions, including the
Twin Lakes, Moffat and Jones Pass Tunnels, which transported a total of 66,000 acrefeet. Then, in 1940 the first phase of construction began on the Colorado-Big Thompson
Project. Currently, thirty-seven transmountain diversions exist in Colorado.
The Fryingpan-Arkansas Project is built upon this foundation of Colorado water
law and precedent. It is also a classic example of a Bureau of Reclamation multipurpose
'^Colo Const, Art XVI, § 5-6; See Bountiful City v. Deluca and H am m ond v. Rose for legal precedents to
the prior appropriation doctrine; Dale A. Oesterle, and Richard B. Collins, The Colorado State
Constitution: A Reference Guide (London: Greenwood Press, 2002), 338-42; Young, Understanding, 71-3.
M.C. Hinderlider, Thirty-first Biennial Report o f the State Engineer to the Governor o f Colorado, 1941-2
(Denver: Bradford-Robinson Printing Co., 1943), 18-20; Cole, “Transmountain,”: 54, 58, 61.
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project. Features include storage reservoirs for irrigation, municipal and industrial use,
hydroelectric facilities, and flood control, recreation and fish and wildlife facilities.
Opponents of the project often called it the “Rube Goldberg o f the Rockies.””"*

The Battle Over the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project
The Fryingpan-Arkansas Project was initially only one component of the more
ambitious Gunnison-Arkansas Project. The Gunnison-Arkansas Project (GAP), actively
pursued by East Slope water developers and Arkansas Valley farmers during the 1930s
and 1940s, would have diverted 800,000 acre-feet of water from the Gunnison River and
the Colorado River Basin to the Arkansas River Basin on the East Slope each year.
Anxious Arkansas Valley farmers suffering through the drought-ridden 1930s believed
that the GAP would guarantee consistent irrigation flows and allow them to expand their
enterprises. Meanwhile, the populations of Front Range cities such as Pueblo and
Colorado Springs exploded, as did the number o f water-reliant industries in the area like
Colorado Fuel and Iron (CF&I), one of the nation’s largest steel producers. All of these
parties shared the concern that any shortage o f water would limit their growth, so they
supported the GAP wholeheartedly.*^
But 800,000 acre-feet was, and remains, a substantial amount of water. As lowerbasin appropriators and parties to the compact, Californians were horrified by the idea of
losing that much of water; in fact they opposed nearly every project to come out of Upper
Colorado Basin states for fear o f losing a single drop o f water. Although Colorado was
“Two Californians Boost Pan-Ark,” The D enver Post, 13 June, 1962.
James Earl Sherow, Watering the Valley: D evelopm ent Along the High Plains Arkansas River, 18701950 (Lawrence, KS: University Press o f Kansas, 1990), 3 7 ,4 9 , 53, 59; Stephen C. Sturgeon, The Politics
o f Western Water: The Congressional Career o f Wayne A spinall (Tucson, AZ; The University o f Arizona
Press, 2002), 54-5.
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granted its share o f Colorado River water under the Colorado River Compact and the
Upper Colorado River Compact, whatever water the state failed to use continued on to
California where city planners and irrigators were more than happy to use it.
Congressman Chenowith remembers: “There was no possibility of authorizing a project
which called for a diversion o f that much water and I think that was recognized by even
the most ardent supporters of the transmountain diversion proposal.” Even after Colorado
officially pulled its support for Gunnison-Arkansas Project to pursue the more modest
Fryingpan-Arkansas Project as an independent project, California Representatives balked
that Colorado still had the Gunnison-Arkansas Project on its mind, and was trying to
implement it, piecemeal.

Coloradoans worked hard to assure lower Colorado Basin

states that the FAP was, indeed, an independent project that removed significantly less
water, and eventually they succeeded. The final 1962 bill includes the clause:
[Any] modifications or additions as may be required in connection therewith shall
not, however, extend to or contemplate the so-called Gunnison-Arkansas Project;
and nothing in this Act shall constitute a commitment, real or implied, to
exportations of water from the Colorado River system in Colorado beyond those
required for projects heretofore or herein authorized.
The Fryingpan-Arkansas Project would remove an estimated 69,000 acre-feet of
water from the Fryingpan and Roaring Fork River systems annually, compared to the
colossal 800,000 acre-feet anticipated by the Gunnison-Arkansas Project. The bill
Harold Christy, interview by DuVoid Burris, 27 December 1972, in Fourteen Statements: History o f the
Fryingpan-Arkansas P roject and Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy D istrict (Pueblo, CO;
Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District, 1975), 50-1; J. Edgar Chenowith interview by DuVoid
Burris, 9 May 1973, in Fourteen Statements: H istory o f the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project and Southeastern
Colorado Water Conservancy D istrict (Pueblo, CO: Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District,
1975), 19; Sturgeon, Politics, 55.
Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Subcommittee on Irrigation and Reclamation, A B ill to
Authorize the Construction, Operation, and maintenance by the Secretaty o f the Interior o f the FryingpanArkansas Project, Colorado: H earings on S. 964, 83d Cong., 1st sess., 15-6 June 1953, 39; Senate
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Subcommittee on Irrigation and Reclamation, A Bill to
Authorize the Construction, Operation, and maintenance by the Secretary o f the Interior o f the FryingpanArkansas Project, Colorado: H earings on S. 284, 87th Cong., 2d sess., 28 June 1962, 1-2, 71.
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authorizing the project specified that no more than 120,000 acre-feet could be removed
from the system each year and no more than about 2.3 million acre-feet in any period of
thirty-four consecutive years. Furthermore, FAP lobbyists countered that the project,
unlike the original GAP, would provide only supplemental water to farmers with existing
water rights, and would open no new lands for cultivation, a clause that must have
irritated some agricultural interests who had hoped to increase the size of their irrigated
holdings.

Chenoweth later admitted that he considered the small size of the diversion

one o f the project’s weaknesses. “But,” he continued, “we had to take what we could
g e t.” ^^

Opponents of the FAP had other concerns. One such concern was the persistence
o f nationwide agricultural surpluses. Why, some Congressmen asked, should the nation
finance a project that would bring additional agricultural goods into an already flooded
market? Opponents brought up the issue often in the newspapers and in Congressional
debates. But proponents of the project argued it was a non-issue. Surplus feed grains
were the primary surplus crop nationwide, but Arkansas Valley farmers primarily
produced sugar beets, vegetable crops and grains and grasses for cattle and livestock
feed—none o f which were surplus crops. Furthermore, unlike the Gunnison-Arkansas
Project, the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project opened no new lands for cultivation. It provided
surplus water to irrigators with already existing r i g h t s . O t h e r issues that arose during
the nine years o f Congressional debate included the cost o f the project, its impact on fish
and wildlife, and fears o f land speculation and monopoly. Many congressmen from
Colorado, Operating Principles: Fryingpan Arkansas P roject (1958), 3.
Chenowith, interview, 17-8.
20 “^ h y Congress Should Vote the Pan-Ark” The Denver Post, 2 July 1962; Department o f the Interior,
Bureau o f Reclamation, Econom ic Changes In the Arkansas Valley In C olorado During the 1950s (Denver,
1961), 7.
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States across the nation shared these concerns.

However, the greatest opposition to the FAP came from residents living in
western Colorado. Frank Milenski, an Arkansas Valley farmer, member of the Colorado
State Water Conservation Board, and member o f the Southeastern Colorado Water
Conservancy District’s board of directors for thirty-one years concluded:
While the federal government was funding major reservoir projects for the
lower basin states o f the Colorado River, little funding came through to help
Colorado develop reservoirs for western slope water. As a result, canal
companies and cities on the eastern slope have tried to get western slope water in
any way they could, and in the process have thoroughly alienated residents on that
side of the state.... I really think they would rather see the water run down the
Colorado River and into California than see it being used in eastern Colorado.
As mentioned earlier, Colorado’s prior-appropriation water-rights system permits
interbasin water transfers on the condition that the water is put to beneficial use and does
not remove water already allocated to senior-rights holders. Back in the 1930s Western
Slope residents rebelled against the huge removal of water proposed under the ColoradoBig Thompson Project. To alleviate their concerns, planners built a “compensatory
reservoir” on the West Slope to serve the region’s interests and guarantee minimum riverfiows throughout the year. In 1943 the State strengthened the precedent for this type of
compensation by amending the original Water Conservancy District Act. Subsequent
transmountain diversion projects would have to be designed, constructed and operated so
that Western Slope uses o f the watershed were not impaired—the construction of
compensatory storage reservoirs became implied.

Frank Milenski, Water: The A nsw er to a D e se rt’s Prayer, ed. Beatrice Spade (Boone, CO: Trails
Publishing Co., 1990), 27; See Coffin v. Left H and Ditch Co. (1882); Daniel Tyler, The Last Water Hole In
the West: The Colorado-Big Thompson P roject and the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District
(Niwot, CO: University Press o f Colorado, 1992), 3; J. Gordon Milliken, “Water Management Issues in the
Denver, Colorado, Urban Area,” in Water and A rid Lands o f the Western United States, ed. Mohamed T.
El-Ashry and Diana C. Gibbons (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 342; James Lochhead,
Transmountain Diversions in Colorado (Boulder, CO: Natural Resources Law Center, 1987) 5-7.
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In 1953, designers o f the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project proposed a compensatory
reservoir on the Roaring Fork River just above the town o f Aspen, in Pitkin County,
Colorado. The reservoir would be a small one, with the capacity to hold 28,000 acre-feet
o f water, but the FAP’s designers argued that this amount guaranteed adequate water
flows downriver. West Slope water brokers and residents disagreed. Many could not see
what benefit such a small compensatory reservoir could provide for their cities and
industries. Furthermore, Pitkin County residents became livid about the prospect of
having a reservoir o f any size constructed in their midst.
Western Slope residents had other concerns about the project. In 1953, the first
year Chenowith introduced the FAP in Congress, a coalition from Pitkin County that
included residents, officials, commissioners, business leaders members of other
prominent organizations wrote a scathing critique o f the FAP. Its author, L. D. Chalfant,
condemned the cost estimates o f the project, writing that they were “understated.” The
construction of the FAP would require huge subsidies to be paid by Americans living
inside and outside the region. Chalfant argued that huge subsidies would be forced on the
taxpayers.

Chalfant also deduced that the price of water would be held artificially low

for irrigators, amounting to even greater publicly-financed subsidies. The FAP, he
continued, would undermine Bureau of Reclamation laws designed withhold aid to farms
greater than 160 acres; “We would like to draw to the attention of the committee that 921
farms are listed in the 322,000 acres to be irrigated. This works out at 350 acres per
farm. Some large land owners will reap the exorbitant profits at the public’s expense.”
He warned that wildlife and fish on the Roaring Fork River would be endangered,
cautioned that the removal of Western Slope water would threaten industrial and natural
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resource development in the area, and surmised that the government’s estimated
contribution to the FAP for “flood control” on the Arkansas was excessive: “in a project
with a relatively high benefit cost ratio... flood control is bearing more than its proper
share of the cost of the project.” In conclusion.
The Roaring Fork, the Frying Pan River and their tributaries are not the
property of the citizens o f Pitkin County nor should they be despoiled for the
benefit o f a small group in the Arkansas Valley. They are irreplaceable and
should be held for the benefit and pleasure of all the people of the nation....
Among those opposed to the project we have firstly all the people of the United
States who will deprived o f one o f their most beautiful recreation areas; secondly,
the taxpayers who will have to foot the bill; and thirdly, the citizens of the
Western Slope, who will suffer loss of income and in value o f property.... This
scheme is for sectional and bureaucratic advancement (Political Pork). It is
unsound economically, ill-advised, exorbitant in cost with complete disregard for
the taxpayers. ^
The concerns voiced by Pitkin County residents remained by far the loudest in the
opposition. However, many other West Slope cities and counties voiced their
disapproval. In 1957 the Western Slope County Commissioner’s Association officially
opposed the bill. This organization included members from twenty-four western
Colorado counties, or over one-third of all of Colorado’s counties. Among the most
pressing concerns voiced by other West Slope interests was the region’s potential to
develop oil shale, uranium and coal. Development of these resources could not proceed
in the future without easy access to substantial amounts o f water.

Water attorneys

from the West Slope cities o f Granby and Glenwood Springs lobbied for the addition of
an amendment in the 1957 version of the bill authorizing the FAP that would limit
transmountain diversions in the state to just 20 % o f the annual Upper Colorado basin
run-off for a period o f twenty-five years. This would, one attorney stated “allow the
L.D. Chalfant, “Frying Pan-Arkansas Project-Colorado: Rebuttal Testimony Against the Project,
(Aspen, CO: unknown publisher, 1953), Denver Public Library Archives, 2-7.
“Shale Prospects Spur Diversion Opposition” The Denver Post, 28 June 1957.
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West Slope to catch up with eastern Colorado in the development o f water resources to
which w e’re entitled.” East Slope advocates of the FAP considered their amendment an
attempt to kill the bill.^'^ Regardless, the bill failed in the House again that year.
One Glenwood Springs group organized in the early 1950s called themselves the
“Angrilantes.” They remained vehemently opposed the bill from inception to passage.
An April, 1955 newsletter is worth quoting at length. It read:
Taxpayers angry at FOOL DAMS by DAM FOOLS increasing our seven
million dollars worth of rotting surplus food now warehoused at a tax cost to us of
$700,000 per day....
We Angrilantes... have blown our stacks. We are mad at the Mad-Hatter
promoters, financiers, and starry-eyed reclamationists who want more dams,
adding to our mountains o f purple-dyed potatoes, our 661 million bushels of
mildewing wheat, our over 375 thousand tons o f rancid butter, our hundreds of
thousands of moldy, stale, spoiled cereals, eggs, and the whole smelly inventory
o f a colossal, bankrupt, gangrenous grocery store....
Power? But steam is cheaper, good for miners, doesn’t rape national
monuments, ruin rivers, drown valleys; it is a quicker, better stopgap till the early
and inevitable advent o f atomic power. And steam can be made invulnerable to
atomic attack. Water power is wide open; when bombed becomes a radiation
weapon against downstream populations.
You taxpayers in all the 48 states—not just the West—are paying for this
unholy mess; so if you’re sore at being made a sucker by these double-damdealing water fakers, join our posse, load up your pen and send a sizzling postal to
your Representative and both Senators, warning them to keep hands off the
Frying Pan, the Roaring Fork, Echo Park, etc. “NO MORE DAMS TILL OUR
MILDEWED MOUNTAIN OF FOOD SHRINKS TO A MOLEHILL....”
Such an attack shows both the reasons for West Slope opposition and the emotion behind
such opposition.
More common are letters like those from Gordon Graham, from Rifle, Colorado,
who wrote on behalf o f a local “farmer’s union meeting.” The union voted unanimously
against the FAP, and Mr. Graham pledged to his representative in the House, Wayne

“Moratorium Plan Called Bid to Kill Project” The D enver Post, 27 June 1957.
Angrilantes Newsletter, April 18 April 1955, J. Edgar Chenowith Papers, 75:21, University of Colorado
Library (hereafter cited as Chenowith Papers).
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Aspinall: “We will be watching your efforts... to fight till Hell freezes over for the water
rights for the Western Slope.”^^
Oppositional voices were fewer on the Eastern Slope but still present. The
psychological impact o f the Cold War and the fanatical fear of socialism and communism
in the 1950s spilled over into the discussion over reclamation. A Denver civil engineer
wrote: “[This project] is simply another step in the Socialism that is creeping over the
Nation. I look upon this ‘Creeping Socialism’ as a scourg [sic] that is like a cancer.” One
rancher south of Buena Vista, near Twin Lakes Reservoir, who stood to benefit from the
project wrote Congressman Chenowith in 1951 : “I have no desire to benefit personally at
the cost of shoving our country further into socialism. It won’t take many more of these
expensive projects... to put honest business [sic] under such a tax burden that
government will control all business.”^^
Others voiced concerns about the tax burden the project would place on East
Slope residents. Gilbert E. Gregg, a business owner from Buena Vista fought the FAP on
the grounds that his town would be included in the newly created Southeastern Colorado
Water Conservancy District— the organization responsible for repayment o f the FAP’s
facilities—thus increasing property taxes. Buena Vista, he argued, would receive no
benefit from the FAP. Even more disconcerting, Mr. Gregg claimed in a letter to Wayne
Aspinall: “Yesterday I was threatened quite severely, not in a physical sense, but in a
business way, and given to understand that unless I withdrew my objections to the
proposal that a group o f men, who conceivably could actually hurt me financially would

Letter from Gordon Graham to Wayne Aspinall, 1 March 1957, Wayne N. Aspinall Papers, 20:2,
University o f Denver Archives (hereafter cited as Aspinall Papers).
Letter from O.M. Stevens to Edgar Chenowith and Damian Ducy, 26 July 1951, Chenowith Papers,
74:11; Letter from Parker D. Shepperd to Edgar Chenowith, 16 March 1952, Chenowith Papers, 74:10.
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proceed to do everything in their power to accomplish just that.”^®
Perhaps more importantly, if not as dramatically, in 1955 the Crowley County
Farmers Association, based out of an Eastern Colorado county along the Arkansas, wrote
the following letter to John P. Saylor, Congressman from Pennsylvania, and staunch
opponent of the FAP:
Our committee are all shareholders in the Twin Lakes Reservoir and Canal
Company. We feel that there isn’t enough water available to warrant the
expenditure o f any great sum of money on this type project. Our Company has
more water rights and storage capacity at present than can possibly be obtained
under the Fryingpan deal. Our entire rights, including storage reservoir, tunnels,
etc., can be purchased at a price not to exceed $30,000,000. We do not believe
that there will be enough water available to operate the hydroelectric power
proposed on a ten year average. Our irrigation system has run a little over 90,000
acre feet of water. We are confident that the small amount of water that could be
obtained and put in the storage reservoir after seepage and evaporation, then
divided out to the town and irrigation ditches as proposed, would be scarcely
noticeable as far as the farmers are concerned; and further we feel that for the
Government and the people o f Southeastern Colorado embark upon such a
colossal project would not only be the height o f stupidity, but could prove to be
the ruination of the farmers of the Arkansas Valley.
Furthermore, the letter continued.
We feel that the Fryingpan Project, as talked of, is many times too large
for the amount o f water that could possibly be had. We also feel that many banks
and Life Insurance companies would refuse to make loans on farm properties if
our farms were bonded to the extent that it would be necessary to cover the
farmers’ part of the project.
It is a definite fact that the town and a few farmer stooges are making all
of the big noise about the Fryingpan; and further impossible for the people
opposing the Fryingpan proposition to get the newspapers to print any
information against the proposed project.^^
Indeed, the sentiments o f the association do not appear in newspaper accounts or
Congressional testimony. The influential publisher of the Pueblo Star-Journal and
Pueblo Chieftain, Frank S. Hoag, Jr., became critical to the lobbying effort in favor o f the
Letter from Gilbert E. Gregg to Wayne Aspinall, 9 March 1957, Aspinall Papers, 20:2.
Letter from The Crowley County Farmers Association to John P. Saylor, 18 July 1955, Chenowith
Papers, 76:12.
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FAP for more than ten years. Was Hoag guilty of stifling opposition voices in his
newspaper? The answer is not so clear. In his own letter to Congressman Chenowith in
1956, he writes that the Crowley County Farmers group vocalized opposition to the FAP
because members thought they could sell their Arkansas Valley water rights for a high
price if they made it appear as if the project did not have a chance. He goes on to say:
I am reliably informed that the Crowley County Farmers group... tried to hold
two or three meetings earlier in December and that they had so few in attendance
they couldn’t get any where.... Sollee’s position unquestionably is to try to
blackmail other water users in the Arkansas Valley, particularly Pueblo, into
buying the Twin Lakes water and bailing them out o f their dilemma.

And, indeed, days later, the President of the Twin Lakes Reservoir and Canal Company
wrote to Chenowith that the Association did not represent the feelings of the majority of
stockholders on the passage of the FAP. “As you know,” the President concluded in his
letter, “our company has always cooperated in every way possible to obtain favorable
consideration o f your Bill.”^*
Concerns about the environmental impacts o f Western reclamation projects also
grew steadily during the 1950s. Opposition by Pitkin County residents over such impacts
has been previously noted. The Isaak Walton League of America—with its tagline
“Defender o f soil, woods, waters and wildlife”—voiced concerns over the FAP in 1953,
and members voted in that year to oppose the project. The League’s primary concern
was the preservation o f recreational opportunities. A representative from the League,
J.W. Penfold, wrote in a 1954 letter to the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee:
It would seem... that if the federal government has responsibilities in water
development projects— which change the face of the landscape, the regimen of
great rivers, the biology and ecological relationships o f fish, animal and plant life.
Letter from Frank S. Hoag, Jr. to J Edgar Chenowith, 5 January 1956, Chenowith Papers, 76:12.
Letter from Herbert Schroeder to J. Edgar Chenowith, 7 January 1956, Chenowith Papers, 76:12.
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and it does assume responsibilities for agricultural economics, crop surpluses and
community welfare— it can hardly avoid responsibility for the recreational
“crops” it proposes to alter, diminish or destroy.
However, Penfold added
I should like to say personally that I have considerable confidence in the federal
officials immediately concerned with this project, that they have the desire and
willingness to work these things out cooperatively so as to accomplish the
maximum in salvaging recreation values.^^
The League eventually endorsed the FAP, satisfied that the project’s designers adequately
addressed their concerns about recreation and wildlife.
Historian Stephen C. Sturgeon, in his biography o f Wayne Aspinall, notes that
other national conservation leaders seemed “more puzzled than provoked” by the FAP.
Indeed, letters among members o f the Sierra Club indicate a hesitancy to take a position
on issues that go beyond “national park and wilderness values.” In a 1953 letter to the
Sierra Club Conservation Committee, Richard Leonard, the Committee’s president
concluded:
In cases of serious doubt about the true value of a project, where the area is so
distant from the personal knowledge of the leadership o f the Sierra Club and does
not appear to involve at this stage substantial harm to national park and
wilderness values, it might be best for the Sierra Club to decline to take part in the
controversy.... Opposition on the part of the Sierra Club might be interpreted as
‘habitual’ or chronic opposition o f a California group to any use of Colorado
River water unless the national status of the club is stressed.

Clearly, Sierra Club members saw the potential for involving the club in a wide range of
national environmental issues, but hesitated to do so during this point in history.
Members of the Wilderness Society, on the other hand, did not hesitate to voice

Letter from J.W. Penfold to Congressman William H. Harrison, 2 April 1954, Aspinall Papers, 49.
Letter from Richard Leonard to the Sierra Club Conservation Committee, 28 September 1953,
Fryingpan-Arkansas Transmountain Diversion Project: Envelope o f Newspaper Clippings and Open
Letters, Water Resources Archive, CA (hereafter cited as Envelope o f Clippings and Letters, WRA).
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their opposition to the project from the beginning. Bernard Frank, a member of the
Council o f the Wilderness Society, wrote to Sierra Club leaders:
I believe the time to express interest is now, while the project— and the longrange program o f which it is unquestionably a part—is still in the blueprint stage.
The fact that present procedures for appraising the pros and cons of large-scale
projects are not considered entirely satisfactory, and that thought is now being
given to more satisfactory review procedures makes public expressions such as
that contemplated by the Sierra Club all the more necessary.... As many of us so
well realize, too often the approval of projects on the basis of unrealistic estimates
of costs and benefits has resulted in damage to areas which—to groups like us at
least—constitute highly important, irreplaceable resources
The fact that the
position of the Sierra Club in opposition to such a project will be supported by
that of other groups having national importance should reduce the likelihood of
charges that the basis for its opposition lies in the desire o f the people of
California to ‘monopolize’ flow of the Colorado River.
But such letters, in the end, did not sway senior members of the Sierra Club. David
Brower stayed the Sierra Club’s initial opposition to the project in order to focus the
Club’s efforts on thwarting construction of the Echo Park Dam—a controversial project
that would have flooded Dinosaur National Monument. Brower feared that the group
might undermine its influence on national and regional matters if it appeared to oppose
every proposed reclamation project. Mark Harvey, in his study o f the Echo Park
controversy, A Symbol o f Wilderness, argues:
With the threat to the park system considered to be the critical issue, it becomes
clear why conservation leaders accepted much of what the Bureau o f Reclamation
sought to undertake along the upper Colorado River. With a few exceptions...
they did not challenge the desirability o f large dams or hydropower plants, and
certainly did not hold the Bureau in the same dark light as a later generation of
environmentalists often did. They pressed the Bureau to leave the park system
alone and they agreed to support dams and power plants outside of Dinosaur in
exchange.
Indeed, the Club’s hesitancy to take an official stand on nationwide resource
Letter from Bernard Frank to Richard Leonard, 22 September 1953, Envelope o f Clippings and Letters,
WRA; see also, letter from Howard Zahniser to Richard Leonard, 25 September 1953, Envelope o f
Clippings and Letters, W RA (Howard Zahniser was the Executive Secretary o f the Wilderness Society at
the time and an Honorary Vice-President o f the Sierra Club).
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development issues would not last very long.
The previous discussion is indicative of the debate that played out among
environmental groups in the 1950s. During the 1960s and 1970s these groups would
insert themselves more frequently and more passionately in a wide variety of
conservation issues, including reclamation projects. General public concern over
conservation also intensified during these decades. Congress reacted by passing such
legislation as the National Environmental Protection Act (1969), the Clean Water Act
(1972) and the Endangered Species Act (1973). These Acts and similar legislation
enabled newly established government agencies like the Environmental Protection
Agency to scrutinize the environmental impacts of reclamation projects. Passing largescale reclamation projects became nearly impossible thereafter.
During the FAP debate, however, environmental concerns remained in this
nascent state. West Slope interests concerned themselves more with economic
compensation than environmental compensation, and by 1958 disparate interests came to
some agreement over one of the most contentious issues plaguing the project;
compensatory storage. Parties on the East and West Slopes settled this dispute by
agreeing to build the compensatory reservoir along the Fryingpan River further north of
Pitkin county. Aspen residents who claimed “not-in-my-backyard” breathed a sigh of
relief. Ruedi Reservoir, as the new compensatory reservoir would be called, also had a
100,000 acre-foot capacity—nearly four times the size o f the previously proposed Aspen
Reservoir. A reservoir this size could easily compensate for the 69,000 acre-feet diverted
to the Eastern Slope. An additional 30,000 acre-feet of “bonus water” would be available

Sturgeon, Politics, 58; Mark W.T. Harvey, Sym bol o f Wilderness: Echo P ark and the American
Conservation Movement (Albuquerque: University o f N ew M exico Press, 1994), 56.
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each year to Western Slope interests for whatever means they saw fit. This compromise
was critical for the passage o f the FAP in Congress. It satisfied the opposition within
Colorado enough that lobbyists for the Project now claimed to have statewide support.
Out-of-state opponents who claimed that Colorado itself remained divided about the FAP
were thus denied this critical piece o f ammunition.^^
Other non-agricultural interests also played an increased role in shaping the
project in the late-1950s. Colorado rewrote the FAP’s Operating Principles in 1958,
guaranteeing municipal and industrial interests at least fifty-one percent of the project’s
water. The project’s reservoirs, supporters also stressed, provided recreational and
tourism benefits to the entire state.^^
The FAP’s chances also increased in 1958 when Colorado approved the creation
o f a new taxing district, the Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District. Its
function was to oversee the development and administration of the project and it served
as the taxing entity for repayment of the reimbursable costs o f the project.
Arguably the project’s greatest boost in the late 1950s came when Congressman
Wayne Aspinall signed onto it. Aspinall firmly believed in the value and merit of
reclamation projects, however, the bulk o f his constituency lay in the West Slope. He
fought hard throughout his career for projects that would benefit this region. Aspinall
flip-flopped in his support for the FAP during the 1950s, at times giving it his unvoiced
consent, and at other times condemning it as a scheme to steal West Slope water.

Senate Subcommittee, 1962, 12; Stugeon, Politics, 61.
^’Colorado, Operating Principles, 5.
Charles Thomson, interviewed by DuVoid Burris, 4 November 1974, in Fourteen Statements: History o f
the Fryingpan-Arkansas P roject an d Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District (Pueblo, CO:
Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District, 1975), 155; Colorado, O perating Principles, 5;
Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District, “History and Description o f the Fryingpan-Arkansas
Project,” n.d., <http://www.secwcd.org/Historv%20and%20Description.htm> (7 April, 2004).
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Publicly he often warned that the project would remove excessive amounts of water from
the Colorado River and he criticized the nearly $200 million required for the project. His
stand on the issue, or lack thereof at times, infuriated the project’s supporters. Aspinall’s
main objection to the FAP, however, was that it might prevent passage of the Colorado
River Storage Project, an enormous project that would provide the West Slope with five
reclamation projects and three major hydroelectric dams. Aspinall feared that Congress
might be reluctant to give Colorado more than one reclamation project during this period.
He would not support the FAP at the cost o f this important regional project.
During the late 1950s Aspinall rose through the ranks o f his party in Congress to
become the chair of the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, an important
position for deciding reclamation matters. In 1956 Congress finally passed the Colorado
River Storage Project. Furthermore, in 1958 East and West Slope interests agreed on
Ruedi Reservoir. Aspinall finally felt satisfied that the project protected Western
Colorado interests and fully endorsed it; thereafter he called it a “rescue project” for the
Arkansas Valley. His position as head o f Interior and Insular Affairs committee gave
him remarkable bargaining power over other Congressmen who opposed the FAP but
feared losing his support for projects in their own states. Even California Representatives
gave their reluctant support to the Project.
Much time and effort has been spent so far in this chapter in explaining the
opposition to the FAP. But, the fact remains that from 1953 onward, the majority of
Coloradoans supported the FAP. The Southwestern Colorado Water Conservation
D istrict, the Colorado River Water Conservation District and the Colorado Water
Sturgeon, Politics, 52, 59-60.
Ibid., 57-8, 61, 67; “Two Californians Boost Pan-Ark” The D enver P ost, 13 June 1962; “Unity Within
State Greatest Cause o f Hope for Fryingpan” The Pueblo Chieftain, 10 September 1962.
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Conservation Board— all bodies whose primary interests lay in the Colorado River
basin—supported the project in 1953 and thereafter. However, they made explicit their
reluctance to see any further transmountain diversions constructed between the two
Slopes.

In 1957, Richard Kitchen, chairman of the Committee for Oil Shale

Development—another group invested in the development o f the West Slope—urged
Congressman Wayne Aspinall not to oppose the FAP, stating that FAP opponents
distorted the views of his organization and that, in fact, the Committee had taken no
position for or against the project.
Letters poured into Aspinall’s office from organizations, companies and
individuals across Colorado. Among the organizations that endorsed the FAP:
Democratic State Headquarters; the Salida, Buena Vista and Denver Chambers of
Commerce; San Luis Valley Water Conservation District, National Farmers Union,
Communication Workers o f America, Chaffee County Cattle and Horse Growers
Association, Crowley County Beet Growers Association, American Federation of Grain
Millers, National Sugar Manufacturing Company, Leadville Buena Vista Lyons Clubs,
Colorado Fuel and Iron, Colorado Rural Electric Association, National Rivers and
Harbors Congress, National Lamb Feeders Association, the Denver Post and the Pueblo
Chieftain.
Other supporters included the United Steel Workers o f America, the Colorado
State Industrial Union Council, Chafee County Farmers Union, Pueblo Board of Realtors,
Salida Flying and Civic Club, Southeast Colorado Power Association, La Junta Chamber
o f Commerce, San Isabel Electric Association, Upper Arkansas Soil Conservation
“Three State Agencies OK Fryingpan” The Denver Post, 27 June 1957.
Letter from Richard S. Kitchen to Wayne Aspinall, 3 June 1957, Aspinall Papers, 20:2.
'*3 Memorandum, “List o f Supporters, n.d., Wayne Aspinall Papers, Box 49.
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District, Colorado State Union Council, Pueblo United Labor League, Pueblo Building
Trades Council (AFL), Pueblo Trades and Labor Assembly, Pueblo Area Credit Union
Chapter, League of Business and Professional Women, Upper Colorado Water
Commission, National Wool Growers Association, Colorado Farm Bureau, National
Farmers’ Union. The Holbrook Lake Sportsmen’s Club, based in the eastern Colorado
town o f Swink, threw their support behind the project in early 1953. And, as mentioned
earlier, the Isaak Walton League supported it by 1962. The FAP also had the unanimous
endorsement of the Colorado legislature.
The list of supporters continues, but, perhaps, the most important conclusion to
make o f all o f this official public support is that it shows the extent to which Coloradoans
debated the issue and took a stand on it. The FAP, it may be reasonably argued, passed
because it provided for many Colorado interests. Such a conclusion concurs with Donald
Pisani’s arguments on the “fragmented” nature of water development in the West.
Two other important trends benefitted the FAP’s supporters during the 1950s—
the Cold War and the mid-1950s drought. Initial Congressional debates over the project
in 1953 occurred even as President Eisenhower made the final arrangements for the
armistice ending the war in Korea. In 1962, Congressional passage o f the FAP came
only a year following the disastrous Bay o f Pigs incident and just a few months prior to
the Cuban Missile Crisis. Security concerns clearly plagued the minds of Congressman
who worried about America’s safety and ability to defend itself. Congressmen and
lobbyists who favored passage o f the FAP emphasized the water and electricity benefits

Earl Law, “Statement In Support o f the Frying Pan-Arkansas Project” Chenowith Papers, 74:29; Letter
from Wendell Hutchinson to J. Edgar Chenowith, 5 February 1952, Chenowith Papers, 74: 5; Letter from
G.E. Kimble to H.H. Christy, 3 July 1953, Chenowith Papers, 25:3; M iscellaneous Memo, n.d., Aspinall
Papers, Box 49.
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that it could provide defense industries and military installations in the region. Colorado
Fuel & Iron, which stood to benefit tremendously from project water was, in 1953, not
only Colorado’s largest employer, but also the nation’s ninth largest producer of steel.
The Triplix Corporation and Timken Roller Bearing also did defense work in the region.
Numerous military installations called Pueblo and Colorado Springs home, including the
Air Force Academy and Camp Carson—later, Fort Carson. The Pueblo Ordnance Depot
was the number one supplier of American military forces in the Korean War. Senator
Jackson, during the 1953 Senate debates, commented on the energy needs of the region,
noting, “1 mean it is very essential to the industrial extent o f the country which in turn is
essential to a sound, strong, and healthy military potential.” A nation at war is more
willing to justify expensive measures to ensure its safety and defensive potential.
Lobbyists played upon Cold War fears to add justification to the project’s passage.
Drought also played an important part in influencing passage o f the project. In
the mid-1950s, especially, 1954-6, drought devastated the Arkansas Valley and many
other regions across the West. In fact, dry conditions mirrored those from the disastrous
Dustbowl of the 1930s, a period that would not have seemed so distant to farmers and
political leaders at this time. A Bureau o f Reclamation report written in 1961 played
upon drought fears and concluded that had the project been built by the 1950s, it “would
have prevented much of the economic losses, instability, and lack of vitality of economic
growth that occurred.”
In May, 1961 the Aspen Times wrote an editorial entitled “We Were Wrong
About Fry-Ark.” It reads:
Senate Subcommittee, 1953, 259, 303.
Department o f the Interior, Econom ic Changes, i-7; Ralph Taylor, “Arkansas Valley Water Problems 100
Years Old,” Pueblo Star-Journal and Sunday Chieftain, 2 January 1955.
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Certainly the project was, and still is, expensive. But $160 million isn’t
excessive when other reclamation projects are considered not as much as a couple
of jet bombers and an atomic warhead.
Certainly, we hated, still hate, to see water from our natural watershed
diverted through the mountains to be used for irrigation when we are already
paying for agricultural surpluses. But the water is also allocated for drinking
purposes, for electricity and for industrial use. We are not paying for the
irrigation because the farmers like the other beneficiaries, who get the water must
repay the government for what they use. And whether we like it or not, eastern
Colorado is still part of our state, spends our tax money, provides tax money for
us to spend. Anything that depresses that area ultimately depresses our area, for
we are far from being self-sufficient and need the roads, the bridges, the
maintenance, the state provides. The industry, the people, now exist on the
Eastern Slope. They need the water, much of which runs into the sea every
spring. It is selfish and short-sighted to oppose diversion now on the grounds of
an illusory population or industrial growth on this slope....
Two years ago the project was altered to meet local demands. The dam
and most of the diversions were moved to the Frying Pan at an increase in
proposed cost. As a result most Western Slope opposition, much of which was
centered in Aspen ceased.
This editorial represents a stunning reversal from the position taken by the newspaper and
local residents only a few years before. Still, many Aspen residents continued to oppose
the FAP. The Aspen Times now regularly attempted to alleviate their concerns. Later
that year, an editorial read: “We in Aspen are not living in a vacuum. We enjoy the
benefits o f many government projects. We are also sensitive to the welfare of the state as
a whole. It would be selfish to oppose the Fry-Ark project because it results in more
benefits to others than it does to us. But we feel the benefits to us, both direct and
indirect, would be considerable. T h e Daily Sentinel, a paper based out of the western
community of Grand Junction, similarly reversed its position, stating that the FAP
provides “as much protection to Western Colorado interests as possible, all legal,
political, economic, and geographic circumstances considered.... We urge the House to

“W e were Wrong About Fry-Ark,” Aspen Times, 26 May 1961; “Reclamation, the Fry-Ark and Aspen,’
A spen Times, 9 June 1961.
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vote favorably....
John Barnard of Granby, a water attorney and long time critic o f the FAP reversed
his position in 1962, stating: “I predict that on the average more water will be made
available for beneficial uses in Western Colorado than in Eastern Colorado, as a result of
the construction of [Ruedi Reservoir].... The Fryingpan Arkansas has become acceptable
to at least a vast majority o f the people of Western Colorado.” Furthermore, “It.. .seems
to me the poorest kind of public relations for various news media to continue to paint a
picture which is neither factual nor designed to engender in western Colorado a
willingness to go along with the project as now planned.”^^
Other critics remained steadfast in their opposition to the FAP. Raymond Moley,
longtime writer for Newsweek on water issues, concluded in 1962;
During the years in which I have studied these river problems I have come to the
conviction that in the case of all the states in the entire Colorado Basin, water is
too precious a value to be used for irrigation. This is especially true because of
the immense growth o f the populations all over the Southwest, and also because
we already have a heavy burden o f agricultural surpluses,^®
The Angrilantes also kept up the pressure until the end. A 1962 letter addressed to
Congressmen and newspapers on behalf o f the group called the FAP a “porkbarrel
boondoggle” and once again criticized it for its enormous costs, its potential to destroy
fishing and the environment, its “stupid” power features and its potential to create
increased agricultural surpluses. “We ask you to vote down the Frying Pan-Arkansas
because it is backed only by the promoters, the money men, the Reclamationists, and a
few short-sighted business men who would risk their long-run tourist business for

'** “Fryingpan-Arkansas Project,” The D aily Sentinel, 14 June 1962.
Bert Hanna, “Pan-Ark Plan to Aid Western Slope, Too,” The D enver Post, 4 May 1962.
Raymond M oley, “The Colorado Lifeline,” Newsweek, 12 March 1962.
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temporary profits during construction.”^^
But the opposition that kept Congress from passing the FAP for nine years could
no longer effectively counter the support behind it. Congress finally authorized the
Fryingpan-Arkansas Project in 1962. However, passage came down to a voice vote in the
House. One Representative tried to get a roll call vote, but could not find the support he
needed to carry it through. Congressman Chenowith recalled that approval for the project
would have been very close if it had gone to a roll call vote and many Representatives
had confided to him that strong opposition to the project in their home states remained.
The Senate quickly authorized the bill, as it had three times previously, and President
Kennedy signed it in an elaborate ceremony that featured important lobbyists and
Congressman in neckties, clutching cast-iron frying pans.

Conclusion
Opposition and debate by a wide range o f groups played an important role in
shaping the FAP. That opponents ultimately failed to undermine the project does not
hide the fact that they forced Coloradoans to weigh the benefits and costs for themselves
and take a stand. Most Coloradoans felt the benefits outweighed the costs. The debate
helped to bring to public attention the problems that plagued many irrigation projects—
agricultural surpluses, vague repayment schemes, environmental concerns and others—
more dramatically than ever before.
The FAP, then, marked a transition period in America’s reclamation history. The
debate surrounding the project’s passage reflected long-standing concerns about natural
Letter from The Angrilantes to United States House o f Representatives, 24 April 1962, Aspinall Papers
B ox 49.
Chenowith, interview, 19-20.
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resource development, economic opportunities, population growth, and the limits placed
on humankind by nature. It also reflected security concerns that arose early on in the
Cold-War. But the debate also foreshadowed the emergence of the environmental
movement and its role in voicing concerns that helped define the next generation of
Americans, Such concerns would limit the potential for similar projects in the future.
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Chapter Two
Water and Wealth
“We had hoped to sneak through the conservancy district, your dam, Ladd, without much hoopla.
We underestimated the people’s ability to comprehend the complexities and to react against what none o f
them actually understands, other than instinctively to this day.”
John Nichols, from The M ilagro Beanfield War

The Bureau o f Reclamation and the Army Corps o f Engineers have taken a lot of
heat over the last couple of decades with regard to their role in “reclaiming” the arid
West, Mark Reisner, in his seathing account of Western water development, Cadillac
Desert, argues that the decisions made by these agencies regarding water development
and land settlement over the last one-hundred years proved disastrous. The Bureau of
Reclamation and the Army Corps o f Engineers, he writes, built dams on nearly every
river in the West. They transported water from areas of natural abundance to those of
scarcity, and created major cities and farmlands in the most unusual of places: deserts and
semi-arid deserts. These projects cost billions o f dollars—which U.S. taxpayers are
paying for and will continue to pay for indefinitely—and provided enormous subsidies of
water and electricity to a select few (often wealthy agribusinesses). Projects created to
meet the demands of Western populations, Reisner continues, only spurred more people
into showing up. Sometimes the Bureau and Corps built dams just to build them, no
matter how economically or geographically unfeasible. Often, water projects were pork
barrel projects, traded in Congress for political favors and hometown votes. ^
The supporters of the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project spent a great deal of time,
energy and money convincing Coloradoans and the rest o f the country that this project
was different from previous ones. Project water would be used for supplemental
' Marc Reisner, Cadillac Desert: The American West and Its D isappearing Water (New York: Viking
Penguin, Inc., 1993).
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irrigation only. It would support farmers who had cultivated these lands for decades
previously and needed just a few more drops o f water each year to mature their crops.
The FAP provided water to growing Front Range cities—the operating principles
guaranteed cities at least fifty percent o f project water each year. Hydroelectric features
would bring urgently-needed electricity to communities throughout the state. As if that
wasn’t enough, the project also provided fish and wildlife and flood-control benefits to
local communities, too.
It all sounded very good during Congressional hearings, in small community
meetings, and in the newspapers. This project was different than the other reclamation
projects that cost so much money previously and appeared to provide benefits solely to
agribusinesses and land speculators. It was a convincing argument, and as the previous
chapter illustrates, an argument that swayed most Coloradoans.
But did the FAP turn out to be different than all of these other projects? Did it
prove the exception to the rule? Unfortunately, in many respects, it did not. The Bureau
o f Reclamation financed the FAP with huge federal subsidies. Although the Operating
Principles guarantee municipalities a majority o f the imported water, most have lacked
both the facilities to transport that water and the demand for that water. Irrigators
historically received 77% of the project’s water, sold to them by the Bureau of
Reclamation at incredibly low prices and subsidized by the federal government and,
especially, local communities. The actual operation of the FAP has also been
disappointing. For a variety o f reasons, including lack o f water, lack o f demand and
inadequate storage capacity, the project has imported only around 70% of the amount of
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water it was originally intended to deliver. Hydroelectric facilities, too, proved less vital
and less efficient than originally intended.
In short, the FAP did not live up to the expectations o f its planners and supporters.
Sadly, proclaiming “I told you so” will not turn back the clock or remedy wasted money
and resources. However, although it is easy to play off the Fryingpan-Arkansas as a
financial debacle, as has been done with reclamation project after reclamation project
over the last three decades, this explanation is too simple. In fact, the FAP has
contributed substantially to local economies. For example, it created several recreation
havens like Lake Pueblo State Park, which makes its claim as the fifth most visited
recreational area in Colorado. Furthermore, the FAP still has the potential to create
benefits for a broader range o f Coloradoans. For example, the City o f Colorado Springs
and surrounding communities are currently making plans to build an additional water
delivery conduit to carry more water to their citizens. They are also lobbying to enlarge
the project’s reservoirs and build new ones in hopes o f more efficiently utilizing FAP
water. As water becomes more and more scarce in the West, much good may still come
from the FAP, in economic terms at least.
This chapter will more fully develop all of these findings. It will outline the costs
and repayment of the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project, and examine many unanticipated costs
and often-overlooked benefits. It will determine who the beneficiaries of the project’s
water have been, how this has changed over time, and how it may change in the future.
Although this discussion examines the flaws unique to the FAP, its implications have a
far broader impact in the current debate over water usage and development. Evaluating
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facilities like the FAP is critical as communities out West search with deepening urgency
for new sources of water.

Precedents for Federal Subsidies
The Fryingpan-Arkansas Project assumed multiple functions in order to receive
approval in Congress. The authorizing bill stated that the FAP was approved
for the puiposes of supplying water for irrigation, municipal, domestic, and
industrial uses, generating and transmitting hydroelectric power and energy, and
controlling floods, and for other useful and beneficial purposes incidental thereto,
including recreation and the conservation and development of fish and wildlife.^
The FAP is a classic example o f “river-basin planning.” Under such a planning
approach, the Bureau of Reclamation or other agency develops a long stretch of river—in
this case, the upper-Arkansas— for multiple purposes. The Tennessee Valley Authority
was the federal government’s first significant effort at using this approach. The FAP is
also an example of a related concept, “river-basin accounting.” Marc Reisner criticizes
this approach at length in Cadillac Desert. He notes;
With river-basin accounting, one could take all the revenues generated by projects
in any river basin—dams, irrigation projects, navigation and recreation features—
and toss them into a common “fund.” The hydroelectric dams might contribute
ninety-five cents of every dollar accruing to the fund, while the irrigation features
might contribute only a nickel (and cost three times as much to build and operate
as the dams), but it wouldn’t matter; as long as revenues came in at a pace that
would permit the Reclamation Act’s forty-year repayment schedule to be met, the
whole package could be considered economically sound.
The Bureau o f Reclamation could rake in huge revenues based on the sale of electricity
produced by hydroelectric features on dams. The Bureau called these facilities “cash
register” dams. By adopting river-basin accounting procedures, Reisner elaborates, the

^ Public Law 87-590, 87“*Cong., 2d sess. (16 August, 1962).
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Bureau of Reclamation could justify building dams across the West that were
economically unfeasible otherwise. Such an approach became vital to the very existence
o f the Bureau o f Reclamation: “But even if it subverted logic, economics, and simple
common sense, it was essential to the Bureau’s survival as an institution and to the
continued expansion of irrigation in the high, arid West.” ^
The Colorado River Storage Project (CRSP), passed in 1956, is an excellent
example of this approach. CRSP consisted of a series of dams along the upper-Colorado
River. The most famous— or infamous, depending on your point of view—dam in this
Project was the Glen Canyon Dam. Irrigation and power-production became intimately
linked with the CRSP. Eighty-five cents of every dollar spent on irrigation features
would be financed by power revenue. These subsidies would amount to nearly two
million dollars per farm over the long run, nearly five times their value.^
Back in 1954 Newsweek writer Raymond Moley criticized another proposed
reclamation project, the Upper Colorado River Basin Project, and the “river-basin
accounting” approach. Irrigators in this Project, Morley reported, would only end up
paying 12%-15% of the irrigation costs. The remainder o f these costs would be
postponed, interest-free, until such time as hydroelectric costs were paid and power
revenues could then be applied to irrigation costs. Morley notes:
Considering the long period o f something like fifty years during which the
repayment o f eighteen percent o f the irrigation costs would be postponed (with
interest accumulating), the power projects would never be able to pay them off as
planned by the [Department of the Interior].... Even if we assume that high
power rates could be maintained for seventy-five or one hundred years in order to
pay for irrigation costs, any legislative authorization for such a doubtful
repayment would in effect constitute an advance obligation to pay for projects of
unknown costs and engineering soundness laid out in the master plan. It occurs to
^ Reisner, Cadillac, 135-6.
" Ibid., 140-4.
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me that this binding o f the future to maintain high hydroelectric rates is to assume
that there will never be competition with power produced from the vast deposits
o f coal, gas, and oil shale known to be in the region or from some new form of
energy. ^
In other words, these long-term repayment contracts not only assume a market for
expensive hydroelectric power, but also, minimal facility operation and maintenance
costs. Such has been the case for reclamation projects throughout the West. Economist
Richard Wahl estimated that a mere fourteen percent of construction costs for irrigation
facilities in Bureau of Reclamation projects will ever be repaid—with or without the
revenue from hydroelectric facilities. Voices similar to Morley’s resonated in America
during the 1950s, but, as the previous chapter demonstrated, critics Bureau of
Reclamation and Army Corps o f Engineer projects had not yet coalesced into a
formidable resistance. ®
The revenue-producing potential o f hydroelectric power facilities associated with
the FAP became a large selling point to Coloradoans and members of Congress. But the
project’s repayment plan would not exactly mirror that of the CRSP or the Upper
Colorado River Basin Project. In fact, the hydroelectric features o f the Project would not
be nearly as extensive as the project’s planners first anticipated. Nor would the revenue
produced by these features measure up to expectations.

Paying the Price
During Congressional hearings, the Bureau o f Reclamation estimated that the
FAP would cost approximately $170 million to build in 1962 dollars. Upon completion
^ Raymond M oley, “Irrigation— Hydropower's Expensive Partner,”
14 May 1954.
®Sarah Bates, David Getches, Lawrence MacDonnell and Charles Wilkinson, Searching Out the
H eadw aters: Change and R ediscovery in Western Water Policy (Washington D C.: Island Press, 1993),
133.
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in 1982, the Bureau o f Reclamation estimated the final price tag at $485 million. This
estimate may be overly optimistic, however. Congressional hearings in 1974
documented the costs of the still-incomplete FAP at approximately $501 million.
Regardless, in 1982 the Bureau o f Reclamation finished final construction on the FAF’s
facilities and gave the Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District, the agency
responsible for the reimbursable costs of the project (also referred to as the SCWCD, or
simply, the District, hereafter), a final bill of just over $132 million. The Bureau passed
along the remaining construction costs to American taxpayers. O f course. Congressmen
and Coloradoans understood that the SCWCD would not be held responsible for all of the
project’s costs, some of which would provide recreation, flood control and other benefits.
Also excluded from this figure are the costs of the electricity-producing features of the
project. Nevertheless, the difference between the SCWCD’s financial liability and the
actual costs of the features utilized by the organization is substantial.^
In its 1989 Annual Report, the SCWCD boasted about its close relationship with
the Bureau of Reclamation, members o f Congress and the nation’s Presidents. The report
goes on to list the subsidies provided to the FAP between the years 1973 and 1989.
These totaled nearly $360 million. Most of these dollars reflect construction costs during
these years. However, between 1982 and 1989 the Project still received nearly $63
million, or nearly $8 million per year, on average. Yet these funds do not show up on the
’ Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Subcommittee on Irrigation and Reclamation, A Bill to
Authorize the Construction, Operation, and maintenance by the Secretary o f the Interior o f the FryingpanArkansas Project, Colorado: Hearings on S. 284, 87th Cong., 2d sess., 28 June 1962, 47; Senate
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Subcommittee on Water and Power Resources, Hearing before
the subcom m ittee on water and p o w e r resources o f the comm ittee on Interior and insular affairs, US Senate
on S. 3740, 93'^'* Cong., 2d sess., 18 July 1974, 46; Department o f the Interior, Bureau o f Reclamation,
C ontract Amendment Between the United States o f America and the Southeastern Colorado Water
C onservancy D istrict to Establish the Initial D elivery D ate and to A djust the D istrict's Payments (Contract
No. 5-07-70-W 0086, Amendment No. 2) (23 October, 1981) reprinted in Frank Milenski, In Quest o f Water
(Boone, CO: Trails Publishing Co., 1993), 249; SCWCD, 2003 Annual R eport (Pueblo, CO, 2004), 20.
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SCWCD’s accounting sheets. They are pure subsidies to construction, operation,
maintenance and other miscellaneous costs.^
As for its $132 million liability, the SCWCD passes along forty percent of these
construction costs to municipal and industrial users, and the remaining sixty percent to
irrigators. However, the Bureau charges the SCWCD interest only on the municipal and
industrial portion o f this cost— 3.046 percent per annum on roughly $57 million—but
does not charge any interest on the roughly $75 million irrigation cost. Had the SCWCD
financed the cost o f the FAP through private entities, yearly interest costs would have
been enormous. Even the interest charged on the municipal and industrial portion of the
project— 3.046 percent— falls well below marketable interest rates since 1982, the year
repayment began. Interest-free and low-interest loans on reclamation projects, subsidized
by the federal government, have tapped the average American’s wallet for over a century
now. Had the federal government loaned the money at marketable interest rates or even
used the money to pay off a minute share of the federal deficit, it could have saved the
American people millions o f dollars. O f course, the FAP never would have been built
under such circumstances. Such is the nature o f government subsidized reclamation in
the West—economically unsound and politically motivated—and the FAP is no
different.^
Repayment, however, gets even more convoluted. The Bureau applies municipal
and industrial revenues directly towards the principle of the loan—towards the $57
million. The SCWCD estimates that it will pay o ff these costs—the only costs charged

®SCWCD, 1989 Annual Report (ŸushXo, CO, 1990), 7.
^ State o f Colorado, Operating Principles: Fryingpan-Arkansas P roject {1958), 5; Department o f the
Interior, Bureau o f Reclamation, Supplemental Feasibility Analysis: Fryingpan-Arkansas Project,
C olorado (March 1961), 6.
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interest by the Bureau of Reclamation—by 2012. Thereafter, revenues from these
sources will be applied exclusively to the costs attributed to irrigation. Cities and
industries that use water after 2012, in other words, continue to subsidize irrigation water
even after their own liability is paid off.*®
The SECWD takes irrigation revenues, on the other hand, and applies them, first,
towards the annual costs o f operation, maintenance and repair. After it pays these costs,
the District contributes whatever is left to the principle. The District expects to pay off
irrigation costs—all interest free— around 2031, fifty years after the start of repayment.**
Finally, there are the power revenues. The Repayment Contract for the FAP
states:
In the event payments made by the District pursuant to the provisions of this
Article 11 are insufficient to meet the District's obligation to repay the cost of the
project works allocated for irrigation.,. the District shall be entitled to repayment
assistance from revenues from the sale o f electric power generated by project
facilities.” *^
The Bureau o f Reclamation anticipates that the costs attributed to hydroelectric facilities
will be paid off within forty years o f completion—around 2021. Thereafter, power
revenues, too, help pay off irrigation costs. Here we see river-basin accounting in action.
But from design to finish, neither the Bureau of Reclamation nor the SCWCD
ever anticipated that power revenues would pay for the bulk o f the project’s construction
costs as they had in projects like the Colorado River Storage Project.

Does that mean

Colorado, Operating Principles, 5; Department o f the Interior, Bureau o f Reclamation, Supplemental
F easibility Analysis, 6.
" Colorado, Operating Principles, 5; Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Richard W. Wahl and Bruce C. Driver,
“Facilitating Voluntary Transfers o f Bureau o f Reclamation-Supplied Water, Volume I” (Boulder, CO:
Natural Resources Law Center, 1991), 5.
Department o f Interior, Contract Amendment, 252.
Department o f Interior, Supplemental F easibility Analysis, 6.
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that revenues from sales of FAP water to cities, industries and farmers pay for most of the
SCWCD’s financial liability to the Bureau of Reclamation? Unfortunately, it does not.
The SCWCD charged agricultural water users $8.25 per acre-foot for water in
2003, and municipal users, $9.00 per acre-foot. The Bureau o f Reclamation re-evaluates
this rate every four years, and makes changes according to the findings of a Repayment
Analysis and Ability to Pay Study—a feature introduced in 1924 with the Fact Finders
Act and common to many reclamation projects in the West. Frank Milenski, a member
o f the Colorado State Water Conservation Board and a member of the SCWCD’s board
o f directors for thirty-one years, estimated the full price of FAP water in 1990 at around
$151 per acre-foot.
The difference between $8 or $9 per acre-foot charged and $151 per acre-foot of
water cost is tremendous. Where does the SCWCD receive the bulk of its revenue, if not
from hydroelectric power? In its 2003 Annual Report, the SCWCD reported that the
District paid the Bureau o f Reclamation just over $6 million dollars that year. Only 4%
o f that $6 million came from sales of Project water. Nearly 80% o f this money came
from property taxes. In other words, $5 million of the $6 million paid to the Bureau of
Reclamation came out of the pockets o f the District’s residents (See Chart 1). The
SCWCD’s boundary includes all, or a portion o f nine Colorado counties; Chaffee,
Fremont, Pueblo, El Paso, Crowley, Otero, Bent, Kiowa and Prowers. All property

In comparison, the typical cost to permanently purchase an acre-foot o f water native to the basin is $2-3
thousand (see Roy Smith and Linda Hill, editors, Arkansas River Needs Assessment, A Report prepared by
the Cooperative Effort o f the USD! Bureau o f Land Management, USDI Bureau o f Reclamation, USDA
Forest Service and the Colorado Department o f Natural Resources (July 2000) 3-2); U.S. Department o f the
Interior, Contract Amendment, 252; SCWCD, 2003 Annual Report, 13; Frank Milenski, Water: The Answer
to a D e s e r t’s Prayer, ed. Beatrice Spade (Boone, CO: Trails Publishing CO., 1990), 141; Lawrence J.
M acDonnell, From Reclamation to Sustainability: Water, Agriculture, and the Environment in the
A m erican West (Niwot, CO: University Press o f Colorado, 1999), 65.
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Chart 1. S ource o f P aym ents to Bureau of R eclam ation, 2003
Total Paym ents: $6,241,943
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Chart 2. Total Payments to Bureau of Reclamation, 1982-2003
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owners within the District’s boundaries pay for FAP facilities regardless of the benefits
they receive from them.
El Paso County, home to Colorado’s second largest city, Colorado Springs, pays a
particularly heavy burden. Colorado Springs began receiving FAP water in 1985, after
the completion of the Fountain Valley Conduit, a pipeline that transports FAP water from
the Pueblo Reservoir approximately thirty-five miles north to Colorado Springs.
Although El Paso County citizens receive only about 23% of the FAP’s allocation, its
citizens pay roughly 74% o f the property tax revenues used to repay the federal loan for
the Project.*^ The Fryingpan-Arkansas was unique in its day for its guaranteed allocation
to municipal entities. In turns out that it is also unique with regard to who pays for
irrigation subsidies. Although sales o f Project water and, eventually, power revenues,
provide some money for repayment, local citizens pay the bulk of the bill.
There are other costs to consider, too. Economic analyses became more
sophisticated as the 1960s wore on and, as discussed in the previous chapter, more
Americans began to question the economic and environmental viability of such projects.
In 1971 economists Charles Howe and K. William Easter p u b l i s h e d Transfers
o f Water: Economic Issues and Impacts, in which they argued that for decades Congress
and the Bureau o f Reclamation ignored many of the costs associated with interbasin
water transfers— a term which includes transmountain water transfers. Economists, they
argued, should consider opportunity costs and external costs in addition to the direct costs
o f construction, operation and maintenance when tabulating the benefit/cost ratio of such
projects. Opportunity costs, or the costs of something in terms o f an opportunity
SCWCD, 2003 Annual Report, 20.
Gary Bostrom, interview with author, 18 January 2005; Kristin Bricher, interview with author, 18
January 2005.
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foregone, should be measured for potential reservoir and facility sites, and for the water
in the area o f origin. “Reservoir sites reserved for the public domain,” the authors
elaborate:
are, in general, assigned no opportunity cost whatsoever and in a few cases
positive benefits have been counted for the values of the one time harvesting of
timber or taking o f minerals prior to inundation, no account being taken of
foregone future harvests o f these products.*^
External costs, on the other hand, are those costs placed on parties removed from
project sites. Farmers outside a reclamation area, for example, may lose income if they
are unable to compete with farmers who use subsidized—and, therefore cheaper—
reclamation water. A farmer who raises potatoes in Nebraska without irrigation, for
example, but who pays federal taxes that support irrigation projects elsewhere, may lose
out to a farmer who can produce potatoes in greater quantities and at lower costs using
federally-subsidized reclamation water. Howe and Easter also point out that fertile land
requiring no irrigation laid unused all across the nation even as the Bureau constructed
reclamation projects to open or provide supplemental irrigation on marginal lands in arid
climates. Out o f 638 million acres of land in the United States considered “best-suited”
for agriculture in the mid-1960s, only 200 million acres, or less than a third, were being
used for agricultural production. Other types of external costs affect parties who may
receive poor-quality water downstream from project facilities or experience other forms
o f environmental destruction including damage to fisheries, riparian vegetation and other
habitats critical to surrounding wildlife. External costs arising from environmental
degradation will be explored in more detail in the next chapter.'^

Charles W. H owe and K. William Easter, Interbasin Transfers o f Water: Econom ic Issues and Impacts
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), 170.
H owe and Easter, Interbasin Transfers, 32-3, 55, 106-7, 169-71 ; Sarah Bates, et al., Searching, 140.
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It is reasonably safe to conclude that those who benefit most from the water
developed by the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project pay little of the project’s costs. American
taxpayers pay huge subsidies in terms o f interest rates and construction costs. Taxpayers
within the District are especially hard hit by these subsidies. But who utilizes the project
water? Can these huge subsidies be justified in the benefits the project’s water provides
for millions of Colorado residents?

Who Benefits?
Between the years 1982 and 2003, the SCWCD paid the Bureau of Reclamation
approximately $35 million of its $132 million liability. The Repayment Contract requires
that revenues first be applied to annual operation and maintenance costs, then to interest
on the costs allocated to municipalities and industries (at 3.046% per annum), then to the
actual principal obligation of the municipal and industrial costs, and, finally, to the
principal on the irrigation debt obligation. In this twenty-one year period, the District
made payments totaling about $84 million. An exact breakdown o f these payments is
shown in Chart 2. Note that only 5 percent o f these payments went towards paying off
the balance of the FAP’s irrigation costs.
Yet, between the years 1972 and 2003 the District allocated 77% o f project’s
water to agricultural users and the remaining 23% to municipal and industrial users (See
Table 1). Although the Operating Principles guarantee municipalities 51% of the FAP’s
water, cities between these years never asked for their full allocation of water until
2002— thirty years after the completion o f the project’s initial facilities. The District
allows irrigators
SCWCD, 2003 Annual Report, 20.
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Fryingpan-Arkansas Project Water Allocations in Acre-feet, 1972-2003
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Select Agricultural Data for the Arkansas Valley, 1949 and 1959
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-28
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to purchase whatever water the cities do not request. Between these years, then, it
appears that the majority of the FAP’s benefits went to irrigators in eastern Colorado.^®
Part o f the reason Colorado Springs has not asked for its full allocation of water is
that it lacks the facilities to transport that water. The capacity of the Fountain Valley
Conduit is not sufficient to deliver the city’s full allocation. Over the last twenty years,
the demand has not been such that the Colorado Springs felt compelled to build
additional facilities to transport its share o f water. That changed, however, in 2002 when
Colorado suffered under a severe drought and Front Range cities tried to utilize their fair
share of project water. Unfortunately, the SCWCD had little water to give in 2002. In
that year the District allocated just over 10,000 acre-feet of water. This sum pales in
comparison to the approximately 77,000 acre-feet allocated in 2001, and the 156,000
acre-feet allocated in 2000.^^
In 2003 Colorado remained thirsty. Cities asked the District for 44,000 acre-feet
o f water, while agricultural entities requested 109,000 acre-feet. The District had only
37,500 acre-feet to give. Cities received their full 51% allocation (18,016 acre-feet), and
irrigators, 49% (17,153 acre-feet—see Table 1). But this amount barely wetted the thirsty
throats o f these entities. In 2003, the FAP, approved by Congress to provide water in

SCWCD, 2003 Annual Report, 13.
In 2000 the SCWCD allocated carryover water from previously wet years, which explains why their total
allocation for this year was so high. Because Colorado experienced three wet years in a row, 1998, 1999
and 2000, the Bureau found itself holding more water than in knew what to do with. Imports through the
Boustead Tunnel were shut o ff because all o f the East Slope reservoirs had reached capacity; Joey Bunch,
“Drought W on’t Relent Soon, Experts Warn, The Denver Post, 5 December 2002; Gail Pitts, “Drought
Takes Drastic Toll on Harvest, The Pueblo Chieftain, 15 January 2003; “Drought Worst In 277 Years,” The
C olorado Springs Gazette, 23 September 2002; SCWCD, 2003 Annual Report, 9; SCWCD, 2000 Annual
R eport (Pueblo, CO, 2001), 6.
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times o f scarcity, yielded barely half the amount designers intended— 69,000 acre-feet.
In 2002, the SCWCD squeezed out a little more than one-seventh o f that amount.
A long-term look at water imports does not paint a prettier picture. An average of
48,410 acre-feet of water passed through the Boustead tunnel each year during the
project’s thirty-two year history. This amount is a mere seventy percent of the 69,000
acre-feet planners expected from the project each year.^^ The failure to import the full
69.000 acre-feet is the product of several factors. In dry years, for example, little water is
available anywhere in the state. Even if 69,000 acre-feet worth of water could be
collected in the FAP’s facilities, it could not transport that water to the East Slope
because o f commitments to maintain minimum flow standards in the Colorado River
Basin. These standards guarantee sufficient water to meet allocation and fish and wildlife
obligations in that basin.
In years of plenty, on the other hand, the problem has been insufficient water
storage on the East Slope. The 1989 water-year provides an excellent example of the
inefficiencies which plague the SCWCD’s efforts to allocate FAP water. In 1989 the
Project made almost 200,000 acre-feet o f water available to the District. This large
availability of water resulted from above-average precipitation levels over the previous
three years. The District purchased only about 108,000 acre-feet. A little more than
8.000 acre-feet of water evaporated.^"* Under their contract with the SCWCD cities can
store project water behind the Project’s dams for an extended period o f time. The use of

^ SCWCD, 2003 Annual Report, 2, 11, 12.
Department o f Interior, Bureau o f Reclamation, Annual Operating Plans: Fryingpan-Arkansas Project,
W ater Years 1989-1990 (Billings, MT: Bureau o f Reclamation, 1989), 8; Department o f Interior, Bureau o f
Reclamation, ^ ««Mû/ Operating Plan: Fryingpan Arkansas Project, Water Year 2003 Operations,
published online, < http://www.usbr.gov/gp/aop/fa/03/03operations.htm> (9 May 2005).
^ Department o f the \x\teriox. Annual O perating Plans 1989-1990, 14-6; SCWCD, 1989 Annual Report
(Pueblo, CO, 1990), 16.
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storage in this way leaves less room for native water storage. Excess native water is
“dumped” down the Arkansas River, unused. In other words, the reservoirs of the FAP
are so filled at times with water diverted from the West Slope and saved by the cities for
future use that “native” Arkansas River water runs down its natural course, unused. It
appears an incredibly inefficient way to utilize Colorado’s water.
Such has been the case during most o f the FAP’s years o f operation. The problem
has not been lack of water, but an excess of water. The Project has consistently supplied
more water than Colorado entities have demanded.^^ This o f course, will likely change as
cities like Colorado Springs grow and build more facilities to transport their share of
water.
Unfortunately, optimistic projections for hydroelectric energy did not become a
reality either. Originally, plans for hydroelectric development called for the construction
o f seven power plants, which could produce a combined 505 million kilowatt-hours of
electrical energy per year. That would have been enough electricity to serve the entire
East Slope—roughly two-thirds o f the Colorado’s population in the 1960s.^^ The final
project included one modest-size power plant, the Mt. Elbert Pumped-Storage
Powerplant, adjacent to Twin Lakes. This power plant has a 200,000 megawatt capacity.
If operated at its maximum potential, it could produce enough energy to supply
approximately 50,000 homes. But the Bureau admits: “Unfortunately, the available water
is not adequate to drive these large generators continuously; therefore the units are shut
down at the end of the evening power demand peak.” When this happens, the facility
^ M ilenski, Water: The Answer to a D esert's Prayer, 141; also see MacDonnell, Wahl and Driver,
“Facilitating,” 5.
M acDonnell, Wahl and Driver, 5.
E.T. Halaas, The Fryingpan-Arkansas Project: A Summary Statement and Analysis o f Project Features,
O bjectives and Feasibility (Denver, CO: Colorado Public Expenditure Council, 1955), 3, 9.
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literally pumps water back up 445 vertical feet to Forebay Reservoir, where it originally
entered the penstocks: “Water can be pumped back into the forebay during times when
power demands are low and surplus low-rate power is available from other generating
stations. Once the water is returned to the forebay, it can be used again to generate more
power during peak demand times.” It is a marvel of hydroelectrical engineering, but not
nearly the electricity-producing monster first suggested by the FAP’s early advocates. ^
In fact, the Mt. Elbert Powerplant produces, on average, only around 365,000
megawatt hours annually. In 1993, about 971,000 acre-feet o f water ran through the
Plant’s turbine generators to produce about 355,000-megawatt hours o f energy (a below
average year). O f that water, only 77,000 acre-feet came from water pumped from the
West Slope to Turquoise Reservoir and through the Mt. Elbert Conduit. Water falls
downward in elevation from these sources, thereby producing cheap electricity,
efficiently. However, the plant pumped an astonishing 902,000 acre-feet of water up the
445 vertical feet to Forebay Reservoir using cheap energy purchased during off-peak
hours— usually early in the morning (note that some water is lost, probably due to
evaporation and other causes). This same water again descends through the turbine
generators during the hours when energy needs peak and power is sold at higher rates.
Kerry McCalman, the Bureau of Reclamation’s Regional Power and Maintenance
Administrator, estimates that it takes approximately 40% more energy to pump that water
uphill than will be received when the water falls back through the turbines. In other
words, it is an energy-consumptive operation that makes profit based on buying cheap
energy during off-peak hours, and selling more expensive energy (though less) during
U.S. Department o f the Interior, Bureau o f Reclamation, Fryingpan-Arkansas Project, Colorado
(government document, unknown publishing location, publisher and date), 16; Halaas, FryingpanArkansas, 3, 9.

62
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

times of peak demand. McCalman admits that the value of the Mt. Elbert Powerplant
depends entirely on fluctuations o f power rates. In the early 1980s, then again in more
recent years, the difference between peak and off-peak electricity rates was minimal. If
used during these years, the Powerplant would operate at a loss. Over the last twenty
years “it has largely operated in the red,” McCalman concedes.

In addition, there are

always the operation and maintenance costs to pay for on this beast of a powerplant,
which run two-and-a-half to three times those of many of the Bureau’s other power
generating facilities, and almost seven times those of its best performers.^®
The discussion above is important for several reasons. First, it is obvious that the
water expected from the West Slope has not matched the designers’ expectations.
Second, low demand and inadequate storage created a history of inefficient utilization of
water. For most of the Project’s history, demand for the FAP’s water by municipal
entities has not even approached the supply. In years of dearth, however, supply was
unable to match demand. Perhaps, in this last point, however, we ask too much of the
FAP. Water storage can be manipulated, but the ultimate source o f water, Mother
Nature, remains out of the Bureau o f Reclamation’s— or any other earthly entity’s—
ability to control. The SCWCD and Front Range cities, as will be seen later in this
chapter, have proposed a restructuring o f the Project’s facilities to alleviate discrepancies
between supply and demand o f FAP water.

Kerry McCalman, interview with author, 11 May, 2005; Department o f Interior, ytnnuo/ Operating Plan,
2003.
30 Department o f Intenoi, Annual O perating Plan, 2003.
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Other Benefits
O f course, the FAP yielded many economic benefits which are difficult to
measure. The project created a significant number of jobs for many local communities
during the construction period and continues to do so in its operation and maintenance
divisions. Local communities benefit from tourists who use the project’s reservoirs.
Ruedi Reservoir, a relatively large reservoir for the Western Slope, is situated at an
elevation that keeps water temperatures warm enough for waterskiing and swimming
during the summer. Many out-of-state visitors utilize the reservoir’s facilities and
contribute to the economies o f local cities like Basalt and Meredith.^ ^
The project enlarged Turquoise Reservoir, which stands at the receiving end of
the Boustead Tunnel, from a water holding capacity of 17,000 acre-feet, to one able to
contain approximately 130,000 acre-feet o f water. It enlarged Twin Lakes’ capacity from
117,000 acre-feet to 166,000 acre-feet. An estimated 76,000 people recreated on or
visited these lakes in 1996. Visitation grows each year.^^
Pueblo Reservoir, the FAP’s largest reservoir and recreational draw, attracted
more than 100,000 visitors during the first month it opened to the public in 1975.
Visitation here, too, grows steadily. In 1996, over 1,543,000 people came to what is now
called Lake Pueblo State Park, up over 41% from the number reported in 1990. This
State Park is the fifth most visited recreation area in Colorado. In 1996 it brought
approximately $34 million into the regional economy. Turquoise and Twin Lakes

Fryingpan-Arkansas Project, Ruedi Reservoir, CO, Round 2 Water Sale Environmental Assessment (Ft.
Collins: Simon, Li and Associates, Inc., 1983), 3.35, 3.43, 3.44.
32 Smith and Hill, Arkansas River N eeds Assessm ent, 1-26
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brought in around $600,000 into their regional economies that same year.

In economic

terms, these reservoirs have made an enormous dent in the region’s economy, to the
benefit o f many who help support the costs of the FAP through property taxes.
Flood control benefits provided by the project should also be considered. The
Army Corps o f Engineers estimated that in the 1950s damages along the Arkansas River
downstream from Pueblo averaged almost one million dollars annually, in 1950s prices.
Previous to that, a 1921 flood, the largest on record for Pueblo, caused seventy-eight
deaths and property damages exceeding $19 million. Then, the Bureau of Reclamation
built the FAP’s reservoirs. The Bureau estimated that Pueblo Reservoir provided over
$11 million worth of flood control benefits between 1975 and 2003. Ruedi Reservoir on
the West Slope provided roughly $8 million in flood control benefits between those
years. 34
The FAP provides other intangible benefits to Colorado communities, especially
in the farming communities downstream o f Pueblo Reservoir. Despite the increased
availability o f subsidized water from the FAP, farmers continue to struggle for survival.
Depressed agricultural prices and competition from the larger agribusinesses forced many
o f the valley’s farmers to sell their water rights to Front Range cities like Colorado
Springs and Aurora, a rapidly-growing suburb of Denver. Hundreds of these farmers
moved or retired, leaving their farms idle and further depressing local economies. The
sale o f these water rights peaked in the 1970s before the FAP reached its full capacity for
Bob Overton, “Reservoir Attracts Nearly 100,000 In First Month,” The Pueblo Chieftain, 2 August 1975;
Smith and Hill, Arkansas River Needs Assessment, 1-26, 6-4; also see Pricewaterhouse Coopers’ 2002
C olorado State P a rk s’ M arket Assessm ent Study, published online,
< http://www.parks.state.co.us/home/kids/publications/2002%20CO%20State%20Parks%20Market%20Ass
essment4-15-03% 20Screen% 20optimized.pdf> (9 May 2005).
Halaas, Fryingpan-Arkansas Project, 6; James Earl Sherow, Watering the Valley: Developm ent Along
the High Plains Arkansas River, 1870-1950 (Lawrence, KS: University Press o f Kansas, 1990) 10;
Department o f Interior, ^«nwa/ Operating Plan, 2003.
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water storage and benefits. Without the FAP it is likely more o f the valley’s residents
would have hedged their bets and sold off their remaining water rights. The sale of water
rights and the exodus o f even just a few hundred residents can and has had a devastating
effect on the small communities in the Valley. Robert Young, an agricultural economist
at Colorado State University looked at the effects o f removing water from Crowley
County, an Arkansas Valley county with a population of approximately 5,500. He
estimated that direct-farming job losses from the transfer of water rights would eventually
reach 150 full-time jobs. Another 100 indirectly-linked job losses could accrue.
Currently, only 5% of historically irrigated lands remain in irrigation in Crowley County.
Economist Charles Howe estimated that in the Arkansas Valley could expect one job loss
for every 308 acres removed from irrigated agriculture. Of course, both Young and
Howe anticipate higher benefits to Colorado communities that receive the water.
However, they emphasize that, in general, benefits accrue in urban markets, while costs
accrue in the rural communities. The analyses of Howe and Easter are relevant to this
discussion because they show what impact the loss of farms can have on small
communities. Without FAF-subsidized water it is highly likely that losses in these small
communities would have been much higher.
So, it appears that the scorecard that reveals costs and benefits is a confusing one.
It is difficult to quantify these costs and benefits, though many have tried. Still, the

M acDonnell, From Reclamation, 56-7; Robert A. Young and R. Garth Taylor, “Some Measures o f the
Econom ic Impacts o f a Large-Scale Rural to Urban Water Transfer” (paper presented at Seminar on Water
A llocation and Tranfer Systems in a Maturing Water Economy, University o f N ew England, Armidale,
N SW , Australia, July 1990), paraphrased in MacDonnell, From Reclamation to Sustainability, Charles W.
H owe, Jeffrey K. Lazo, and Kenneth R. Weber, “The Economic Impacts o f Agriculture-to-Urban Water
Transfers on the Area o f Origin: A Case Study o f the Arkansas River Valley in Colorado,” American
Journal o f Agricultural Economics (December 1990), 1200-04, paraphrased in M acDonnell, From
Reclam ation to Sustainability, Sarah Bates, et al.. Searching, 135.
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inefficiency and misdistribution of these costs and benefits make projects like the FAP
^PpGar to be misguided mistakes. But, the record is not yet complete.
Recent Changes and Future Potential
One successful innovation enacted by the SCWCD, under the guidance of Charles
(Tommy) Thomson, who held the position o f general manager from 1966 until 1994, was
the Winter Water Storage Program. This Program allows Arkansas Valley ditch
companies to store the water flowing out o f the mountains during the winter months in
FAP facilities like Pueblo Reservoir. Winter irrigation did little to build soil moisture
levels, but most farmers felt they could use their allocated water to minimal positive
effect, or lose it, to no positive effect. The Winter Water Storage Program allows them to
divert their stored water during the beginning part o f the irrigation season when such
water becomes many times more valuable. The Winter Water Storage Program creates
revenue for the SCWCD, though not a considerable amount. In 2003, the Program
generated approximately $90 thousand dollars— approximately 1% o f the District’s
payments to the Bureau o f Reclamation (See Chart 1). Since 1982 it has helped pay
approximately 4% of the SCWCD’s debt obligation to the Bureau of Reclamation.^®
The City o f Colorado Springs has also moved to make more beneficial use of the
FAP’s existing facilities. Recall that El Paso County residents pay for 74% of the
property tax revenues used to repay the federal loan for the FAP and its facilities, despite
receiving only about 23% o f Project water. In the early 2000s, Colorado
Springs forged ahead with plans to construct the Southern Delivery System (SDS). Part
o f the reason Colorado Springs has not received their allocated share o f water has been
that the City has not had the facilities to transport that water. The Fountain Valley
^ SCWCD, 1998 Annual Report (Pnoblo, CO, 1999), 15; also see MacDonnell, From Reclamation, 44.
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pipeline delivers a limited amount to the City and surrounding communities, but its
capacity is limited.
Plans for the SDS include two phases. Phase I, scheduled for completion by
2009, includes construction of a 43-mile long, 66-inch diameter raw water pipeline and
pump stations, a water treatment plant, and a series of distribution pipelines to transport
treated water. The water would be removed from the Arkansas River at Pueblo
Reservoir, Phase II calls for the creation of two new storage reservoirs along Arkansas
tributary rivers as well as an enlargement of both Pueblo and Turquoise Reservoirs, two
o f the FAP’s largest storage reservoirs. The removal of water would reduce the
Arkansas’ current flow by approximately 10%, Colorado Springs insists that this
removal would not “dry up” the Arkansas through the City of Pueblo— a contentious
issue for many Pueblo residents. Furthermore, Colorado Springs boasts that a recently
approved “flow management program will provide for more consistent flows in the
Arkansas River through Pueblo,” The city anticipates completion o f the SDS by 2040,
the year the Colorado Springs expects population and development growth to exceed the
current supply of water. The city estimates that the total cost for the SDS will be roughly
$1 billion.
One setback to this plan, however, may be the ticking clock. By 2040 the FAP’s
facilities will be over sixty years old. Optimistic projections calculated the lifespan of
most Bureau o f Reclamation Projects at 100 years. As time progresses operation and
maintenance costs will increase, as will the chances for larger—perhaps fatal—
mechanical problems.
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Conclusion
Ultimately, the Arkansas Valley’s farmers who received cheap, subsidized water
benefited the most from the FAP. It is a criticism common to reclamation projects
throughout the West and it is ably and eloquently expounded by Marc Reisner and
historian Donald Worster in Cadillac Desert and Rivers o f Empire, respectively. Both
authors point out that large agribusinesses ended up being the primary beneficiaries of
Bureau o f Reclamation and Army Corps o f Engineer projects. In 1960, for example,
Californians approved the State Water Project (SWP) at a cost of approximately $1.75
billion. Los Angeles residents largely footed the bill of this enormous project that
pumped water over California’s Tehachapi Mountains. The primary benefactors,
however, ended up being a handful o f agribusinesses. Chevron USA received cheap,
subsidized water for 37,793 acres it owned in the SWP service area. Tejon Ranch, owned
by the Los Angeles Times, irrigated 35,897 acres using SWP water; Getty Oil, 35,384
acres; and McCarthy Joint Venture A, 25,105 acres. Blackwell, Tenneco and Southern
Pacific also used SWP water to irrigate large landholdings. SWP beneficiaries brought
250,000 new acres of cotton, olives, pistachios, almonds and wheat into production.^^
The farmers in the Arkansas Valley who utilized FAP water, however, were
different. The FAP’s proponents offered the project as a means of providing
supplemental water to small Arkansas Valley farmers. And that is essentially, the way it
worked out. In 1949, just four years before Chenowith introduced the FAP before
Congress, 5,462 farms operated in the Arkansas Valley. The average size of each farm
was 887 acres. Just ten years later, in 1959, the total number o f farms decreased to 3,951,
and the average size of each farm increased to 1,251 acres— a 46% increase. (See Table
Worster, 290-2.
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2)

Although the size o f farms in the Arkansas Valley has increased, they do not even

approach the vast holdings o f California’s agribusinesses. Furthermore, it is still
primarily local Colorado residents who own Arkansas Valley’s farms. Nevertheless, it is
a departure from the dream that millions o f Americans had in mind when they supported
the 1902 Reclamation Act. Small 160-acre plots for countless families across the West
had not been realized, nor will it ever be realized in future years. By 1962, however,
most Americans already understood this failure and tried to make the best out of the tools
they had at their disposal.
It is true, then, that in the case o f the FAP, farmers benefited from access to
heavily-subsidized water. However, these farmers are not the big-business-types that
Donald Worster criticizes at length in Rivers o f Empire. Rather, it appears that the FAP
is unique in terms of its costs and benefits, which supports Donald Pisani’s description of
a “fragmented” West.
Congress and the Bureau o f Reclamation accepted a huge portion of the
construction cost o f the FAP, which means, of course, Americans footed the bill. Local
Colorado communities, especially those residing in El Paso County pay a
disproportionate share o f the FAP’s costs even though they receive little water and few
monetary benefits. Only recently have communities like the City of Colorado Springs
pushed to remedy the discrepancy between supply and demand for FAP water with the
introduction of the SDS.
The record o f costs and benefits is a mixed one, and, as yet, incomplete.
Nevertheless, the FAP clearly failed to live up to the expectations o f its designers and

38 Department o f the Interior, Bureau o f Reclamation, Economic Changes In the Arkansas Valley In
C olorado During the 1950s (Denver, 1961), 4.
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early promoters. The FAP provides further proof that huge interbasin water transfers and
dams cost more than they are worth, economically speaking. The final chapter, which
discusses the environmental consequences o f the FAP, will show that the Project’s costs
outweighed benefits in environmental terms as well.
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Chapter Three
At What Cost to the Environment?
Salt— a “silent killer.” That is how Colorado State University faculty described
salt in a 2000 article discussing the impact o f high salinity levels in the soils and
irrigation water of the Arkansas Valley. “Seventy percent of the irrigated fields in the
Arkansas Valley are affected by increased salinity, resulting in an estimated 10-50%
yield reduction for alfalfa and com,” the article states. “Some 25,000 to 30,000 acres of
the roughly 250,000 farmable acres in the Arkansas Valley have been lost to agricultural
production because of this increased salinity.” Stories about the high concentration of
salt in the soils of California’s Imperial Valley have drawn a lot o f attention in recent
years, but salinity has not been a visible problem in Colorado until recently. What has
caused the recent panic over soils in the Arkansas Valley? The answer is, in part, the
impact o f the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project.'
Current agricultural practices, in many ways, fail to take into account the
interconnectedness of an ecosystem’s components. Clive Ponting points out in his study,
A Green History o f the World: The Environment and the Collapse o f Great Civilizations,
that:
All the parts of an ecosystem are interconnected through a complex set of self
regulating cycles, feedback loops and linkages between different parts of the food
chain. For example, the fertility, stability and texture of a soil depend on an
interaction with the other parts o f the ecosystem which have produced it. If one
part of an ecosystem is removed or disrupted there will be knock-off effects
elsewhere in the system. ^
* Jim Valliant and Robert Ward, “Water Relocation In the Arkansas Valley,” Agronom y News 20, no. 6
(Novem ber 2000), <http://www.colostate.edu/Depts/SoilCrop/extension/Newsletters/2000/guAUTUMN00
.htm#mapping%20arkansas%20river>.
^ Clive Ponting, A Green H istory o f the World: The Environment and the Collapse o f Great Civilizations
(N ew York: Penguin Books, 1991), 16.
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The Fryingpan-Arkansas Project disrupts the balance of nature in significant ways. First,
the FAP increases salinity levels in both the Colorado and Arkansas Rivers. Increased
salinity, o f course, detrimentally impacts the fish in these waters; however, it also
negatively impacts the flora and fauna that depend on the soils on either side of the rivers.
The FAP also disrupts water flows and water temperatures in both rivers, further
impacting flora and fauna.
Ponting writes:
The most important task in all human history has been to find a way of extracting
from the different ecosystems in which people have lived enough resources for
maintaining life— food, clothing, shelter, energy and other material goods.
Inevitably this has meant intervening in natural ecosystems. The problem for
human societies has been to balance their various demands against the ability of
the ecosystems to withstand the resulting pressures.^
One means by which Americans attempted to measure and maintain this balance was
through legislation like the National Environmental Policy Act.
Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in 1969. The
purpose o f this act was:
To declare a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable
harmony between man and his environment; to promote efforts which will
prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the
health and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems
and natural resources important to the nation; and to establish a Council on
Environmental Quality.
NEPA requires government agencies to assess the potential environmental impacts o f all
projects that modify the environment in some way. The sponsoring agency compiles the
results o f its studies into an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). This EIS must
consider alternative designs and methods that designers might use to reduce or eliminate

3 Ibid., 17.
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adverse environmental effects. EIS drafters must distribute copies of a Draft EIS to the
public for comment and respond to the comments they receive before submitting the
Final E I S /
Whether or not NEPA has lived up to its supporters’ expectations is debatable.
Regardless, if our attempts to balance the needs of man and nature fail, the outcome
might be disastrous. History proves this point. Millennia ago, Sumerians in southern
Mesopotamia relied on water storage and irrigation to feed its growing population.
Between 3500 BC and 1700 BC Sumerian irrigation practices led to a rise in the level of
soil salinity to the point where those soils could no longer grow wheat. For centuries, the
power o f the Sumerian bureaucracy and army depended on its ability to grow a surplus of
wheat and other agricultural products. Clive Ponting points out: “What is remarkable is
the way that the political history o f Sumer and its city states so closely follows the steady
decline o f the agricultural base.” The conquest by Sargon of Agade, which marked the
beginning of the end for the Sumerian civilization was “contemporary with the first
serious decline in crop yields following widespread salinization.”^
A similar process occurred in the Indus Valley around 2300 BC. Irrigation
provided an agricultural surplus that sustained the ruling elite, priests and armies.
However, it also led to increased salinity levels in the soil and a gradual decrease in
agricultural productivity. By 1900 BC, the soil in the Indus Valley could no longer
support a sizeable population or army. Shortly thereafter, conquest destroyed the society
that thrived there for more than 400 years.^
Is America doomed to a similar fate as that which befell the ancient Sumerian and
Public Law 91-190 (1 January, 1970).
^ Ponting, Green History, 71-2.
^ Ibid., 73-4.
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Indus Valley societies? Such a forecast would, of course, be premature. However,
population and market pressures have left their mark on the environment in the West.
The Fryingpan-Arkansas Project is no small contributor to environmental degradation in
the Arkansas and Colorado River basins.

The Fryingpan-Arkansas Project
Although Congress passed the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project well before NEPA
became law in 1969, the Bureau of Reclamation had built less that half of the Project’s
facilities by that year. The Act required the Bureau of Reclamation to write an EIS on the
project. Completed in April of 1975, this document assesses the environmental impact of
FAP facilities completed up to this date—including Ruedi Reservoir—and the likely
impact o f the facilities under construction. The impacts reported on the FAP’s
Environmental Impact Statement include: loss o f wildlife habitat, displacement o f
wildlife, changes in predator-prey relationships, increased erosion, increased hunting and
fishing pressures, and other terrestrial and aquatic changes, including increased salinity
levels in the Colorado River. Studies published after this Final EIS concur with these
findings and document the extent o f the damages created by FAP facilities.
In this chapter, I evaluate the impact of the FAP and its facilities on the Arkansas
and Colorado Rivers, their tributaries, and surrounding landscapes. The results are
disheartening, although probably not unexpected to many who follow water quality and
development issues. One o f the most pressing issues at present, as mentioned earlier, is
the increase in river salinity levels caused by the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project. Salinity is
not the only problem created by the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project, however. Management
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programs like the Winter Water Storage Program, which allows irrigators to store winter
water flows in the project’s reservoirs until spring, exacerbate problems for fish in the
project’s rivers. Past and present management has resulted in both positive and negative
impacts to the environment in other ways. The FAP changes water temperatures, reduces
spring flooding, and dramatically alters natural river flows. These changes negatively
impact flora and fauna in the project’s rivers and in the riparian habitat alongside them.
The Arkansas River is one o f the most extensively managed rivers in the United
States; management is possible, in large part, because of the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project.
The Arkansas River is what historian Richard White calls an “organic machine”—it is
“an energy system which, although modified by human interventions, maintains its
natural, its ‘unmade’ qualities.” The FAP’s reservoirs, collection facilities and tunnels
are the nuts, bolts and interconnecting parts that, along with the river itself, make up this
amazing machine. The agencies with a hand in operating it include: the Southeastern
Colorado Water Conservancy District, the Bureau of Land Management, the U.S. Forest
Service, the Bureau o f Reclamation and the Colorado Department of Natural Resources,
to name a few. ’
In July, 2002, these agencies cooperated to produce the Arkansas River Water
Needs Assessment, a comprehensive analysis of the upper-Arkansas River’s management
history, its current legal, ecological and recreation concerns, and, finally, management
scenarios that could alter the flow and storage o f the Arkansas River in order to maximize
the benefits for irrigators, cities, flora and fauna, and recreation users. In this document,
Steve Swanson of the BLM emphasizes: “Probably the largest effect o f the Fryingpan-

’ Richard White, The Organic Machine: The Remaking o f the Columbia River (N ew York: Hill and Wang,
1995), ix.
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Arkansas Project is the timing of additional flows in the system and not the additional
volume.” This comment reveals the dramatic changes that have surfaced across the
United States with regard to water development and management.^
Micromanagement o f the Arkansas River’s flow has come about, in part, from
necessity. The public’s attitude towards large development projects has grown more
negative as their knowledge o f these projects’ economic and environmental consequences
has grown. Those who propose legislation for new projects find them nearly, if not
completely, impossible to pass. But water is no less valuable today than it was half a
century ago. Populations in the West have ballooned. Without new sources of water,
community planners and government agencies must manage the water they have with
increasing finesse.
Micromanagement o f water resources allows managers to maximize benefits to
irrigators, urbanites, recreational users and flora and fauna. So far, it has helped stretch
the supply o f water to users who depend on the Arkansas and Colorado Rivers.
However, the environmental consequences have proven severe.

Salinity: “Silent Killer”
Californians and residents o f other lower-basin states along the Colorado River
who fought passage o f the FAP worried about what the removal of water would mean for
their own communities. They also worried about how the FAP would impact the quality
o f the water that would remain in the Colorado River after the FAP began diverting
water. The removal o f water from the Colorado River, especially at the headwaters.
* R oy Smith and Linda Hill, editors, Arkansas River Needs Assessment, a report prepared by the
Cooperative Effort o f the USDI Bureau o f Land Management, USDI Bureau o f Reclamation, USDA Forest
Service and the Colorado Department o f Natural Resources (July 2000), 4-20.
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would result in increased levels of salt concentration downstream.
In its 1400-mile journey across the West, the Colorado River accumulates
approximately 9 million tons o f salt each year. Most of these salts enter the river from
natural sources. For example, rivers pick up small particles of calcium and other
chemical and mineral deposits as they erode rock and riverbank. Agricultural, municipal
and industrial sources, however, have also contributed significantly to the salinity
problems plaguing the Colorado River over the last 150 years. Forty-seven percent of
Lake M ead’s salt concentration, for example, comes from natural sources; 3% comes
from water exports; 1% from mining and industry; 12% from reservoir evaporation; and
37% from irrigation. ^
Salinity levels are determined primarily by two processes. First, “salt loading”
occurs when salts are added to the water. One example of salt loading comes from
irrigation. An irrigator never uses all o f the water diverted from a river. Leftover water
returns to the river o f origin after passing through the soil. Along the way it picks up
additional salts that will increase the total salinity of the river.
Another example of salt loading occurs when water is impounded behind dams.
For example, the water impounded in large reservoirs created by dams often leach
minerals and chemicals from surrounding rocks and sediments. In a 1977 environmental
report, L.M. Finnell noted increases in alkalinity, calcium, hardness and pH in Ruedi
^ Taylor O. Miller, Gary D. Weatherford, John E. Thorson, The Salty Colorado (Washington, D.C.:
Conservation Foundation, 1986), xiii, 5.
Ibid., xiii; The water that passes through irrigated fields and returns to a river negatively impacts the river
in other ways. Water removed from, and then returned to, the Arkansas River and its tributaries, for
example, is generally warmer and carries heavier amounts o f fine sediment. Water from these fields also
picks up pollutants such as pesticides, mineral nutrients, salts, radio nuclides from fertilizers, wastes from
polyethylene tarpaulin and petroleum mulches, the by-products o f combustion o f fossil fuels, and organic
nutrients such as nitrogen from animal manure. All o f these factors create further economic externalities
for downstream users. See Ellen E. Wohl, Virtual Rivers: Lessons from the Mountain Rivers o f the
C olorado Front Range, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 124.
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Reservoir. Before the creation of this reservoir, Fryingpan River water would have
washed quickly through a narrow riverbed, and chemical leaching would have remained
minimal. Now, that water stands for extensive periods of time in a large basin containing
large deposits of natural gypsum, and its salinity levels have risen significantly. A
similar process of salt leaching occurs in all o f the reservoirs along the Arkansas River. ‘'
The second process that determines the amount of salt in a body of water, “salt
concentration,” occurs when water disappears from a source such as a river or reservoir
through evaporation, transpiration or withdraws of less-salty water (from tributaries, for
example). Following such processes, the same amount of salt remains but, now, with less
water to dilute it. Thus, salt concentration increases.*^
The Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project
estimated that the annual removal o f 70,000 acre-feet of water from the Colorado basin
would increase salinity in the Colorado River by 8-12 ppm (2.2-3.3%) at Cameo, CO,
4ppm (0.6 %) at Lees Ferry, AZ and 7ppm (0.8%) at Imperial Dam. These figures may
seem low, but they create enormous environmental and economic changes along the
Colorado River. The EIS estimated that this small increase in the salinity level would
result in a total impact (direct irrigation costs and indirect costs) of $1.6 million per year
(1972 prices) to users in the lower, main-stem o f the Colorado River. A 1986
Conservation Foundation study estimated these losses at nearly $4 million (1984
prices)— all because of what seems a minute increase in the river’s salinity levels.
Small removals of water, here-and-there, however, add up. Total exports of water
" L. M, Finnell, Fryingpan-Arkansas Fish Research Investigations: Final Report {Dewvex, Colorado
Department o f Natural Resources, 1977), 18, 53
Miller, The Salty Colorado, xiii.
Department o f the Interior, Bureau o f Reclamation, Final Environmental Statement: Fryingpan-Arkansas
Project, Colorado (Denver, 1975), ii, IV-4-6; Miller, The Salty Colorado, xiii.
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from the Colorado River total more than five million acre-feet annually. Increases in
water salinity negatively impact water quality for more than twelve million people and
one million acres of irrigated farmland each year; these increases result in an estimated
$91 million worth of damages annually. This figure of annual damages could reach more
than $267 million by 2010.
Clearly, water exports have a detrimental effect on users in the Colorado River
Basin. On the other hand, it seems logical to assume that the rivers receiving exported
water—like the Arkansas—would benefit in terms of water quality. In fact, the benefits
are minimal along the Arkansas. The addition of water into the Arkansas River led to
increased agricultural pressure, which contributed negatively, overall, to water quality.
Salinity levels in the Arkansas rose after irrigators began using imported water. FAP
water ran through farmers’ fields, picked up salts along the way, and returned to the
Arkansas River, “loaded” with those salts.
In fact, the Arkansas River is one of the saltiest rivers in the United States.
Farmers irrigate more than 200,000 acres in the Arkansas Valley with water deemed
Class C4, the U.S. Salinity Laboratory’s highest classification for salinity hazard.
Salinity in the Arkansas River is responsible for several million dollars worth o f damages
annually. Salinity reduces land productivity and can, in particularly extreme
concentrations, sterilize the soil, thereby eliminating crop production altogether.
Oftentimes, as salt levels in irrigation water increase, farmers begin growing salt-tolerant
crops like sugar beets and barley. This has frequently occurred along the Arkansas in
Eastern Colorado. The drawback is that these crops are typically less valuable than less

M iller, JTie Salty Colorado, xiii, 5.
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salt-tolerant crops.
As in the Colorado River, most salts in the Arkansas River come from natural
sources. However, 14% o f the river’s salts come from irrigation salt loading, while 8%
come from municipal and industrial water discharge. Although they contribute only a
low percentage of the salts present in the Arkansas, municipal and industrial sources may
be the most devastating of all because they contribute “highly-soluble” salts—the most
damaging type—to the river. Much o f the river’s salinity comes from salt concentration.
Approximately 85% of the total surface water supply of the basin is consumed before
reaching the Colorado-Kansas state line. O f this water, 60% is consumed by crop
production.*® Donald Miles, in his study of the Arkansas River’s salinity problems,
concludes that:
Salinity contributions by irrigation agriculture result from passage of excessive
amounts of water through the root zone. This may occur as a result of applying
more water than is needed, applying water when it is not needed or nonuniform
application of water which results in excessive irrigation of parts of the field
while other parts are under-irrigated.... Not only does excessive application of
water result in leaching salts, but it also excessively cools the soil, reduces soil
aeration, and sometimes creates a high water table.
One point from Miles’ statement, in particular, deserves attention. Miles points
out that much of the salinity problem in the Arkansas may be traced to poor water supply
timing. The Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District’s (SCWCD) Winter
Water Storage Program impounds water that would normally flow down the Arkansas

Donald L. M iles, Salinity In the Arkansas Valley o f Colorado, (Denver, CO, Colorado State University
Extension Service, 1977), 1,3, 7; Lawrence MacDonnell reports that “the lower Arkansas River in
Colorado is five times more saline than the ‘Salty Colorado.’ In the Lamar area the salinity concentration
measures more than 4,000 parts per million o f total dissolved solids most o f the time, compared to
approximately 850 parts per million o f TDS measure in the Colorado River just above the border with
M exico.” See Lawrence MacDonnell, From Reclamation to Sustainability: Water, Agriculture, and the
Environm ent in the American West (Niwot, CO: University Press o f Colorado, 1999).
M iles, Salinity, 1.
Ibid., 5.
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during winter months. Pueblo Reservoir is the primary storage facility for this program.
The District allows irrigators who have winter water rights to save that water behind
Pueblo Dam for use in the early spring, when it is more valuable and increases an
im gator’s productivity. It benefits both the farmers and the District. But this program
creates negative environmental impacts. Water stored in Pueblo reservoir will evaporate
at a much greater rate than would occur if left to run its course in the Arkansas.
Evaporation increases even more as the weather warms in spring. Water disappears and
salt concentration increases.
The FAP’s Final BIS concludes that the Winter Water Storage Program could
produce changes in water supply timing that would “have a profound effect on river
quality down the valley.” The Winter Water Storage Program would also, the EIS
concludes, create significant “secondary” impacts. One of these impacts would involve
the displacement of more than 25,000 ducks directly downstream from the Pueblo
Reservoir area due to the reduction in winter riverflow.

Similar secondary impacts will

be discussed at length later in this chapter.

Impacts on Fish: Salinity, Water Transfer, Flow Management Schedules, and
Temperature Changes
The FAP and its facilities influence other local “residents”—fish and other
aquatic organisms—that live in these rivers. The Colorado and Arkansas Rivers and their
tributaries provide recreation benefits to anglers from local communities and to tourists
from around the world. The Fryingpan and Arkansas Rivers enjoy a reputation as two of
the most famous trout streams in the Western United States. Fish are a valuable

Ibid., 1; Bureau o f Reclamation, Final EIS, IV-14, IV-31.
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commodity for recreational anglers and local communities.
Fish are also important to the natural balance of the larger ecosystem. They
consume and are consumed, thereby providing a link between the various members of
their habitat. Maintaining this balance and ensuring survival of each and every one of
these ecosystem members has become a priority for wilderness advocates,
environmentalists, anglers, and millions o f other Americans. Diverse organizations such
as the Sierra Club, Colorado Rivers Council, National Wildlife Federation and Trout
Unlimited have voiced their concerns on the preservation of these habitats.
Chemical changes created as a result o f the FAP have negatively impacted fish
and their environment. Besides changes in water chemistry, however, one of the most
obvious challenges to fish and other aquatic organisms in these rivers is the removal of
water. In 1977 L.M. Finnell, of the Colorado Division of Wildlife, noted his concern that
the minimum pool prescribed by the FAP’s Draft Environmental Statement on Ruedi
Reservoir was too low. Kokanee salmon and lake trout, in particular, would be adversely
affected by such a low level o f water. Since then, the Bureau of Reclamation and the
Division o f Wildlife have come to some agreement on minimum reservoir and river
levels.
The Endangered Species Act has added further fuel to the fire in the debate over
minimum pools and minimum river flows in FAP rivers and reservoirs. In 1994 the
Department o f the Interior designated almost 2,000 miles on the Colorado River as
critical habitat for Colorado squawfish, humpback chub, bonytail chub and razorback
sucker— all endangered or threatened species.^® Colorado River cutthroat trout are

Finnell, Fryingpan-Arkansas, 21; Bureau o f Reclamation, Final EIS, Volume 2, XI-430.
Gregory Silkensen, Windy Gap: Transmountain Water Diversion and the Environmental Movement
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especially endangered and require substantial amounts of water during the spring
spawning season. Spring also happens to be the season when most water diversions from
the West to East Slopes occurs.
Starting in 1990, the Bureau of Reclamation and the Fish and Wildlife Service
came to an agreement that provided for the release of additional water into the Colorado
River in order to aid endangered fish. In 2001 alone, the Bureau released 21,345 acrefeet o f water from Ruedi Reservoir. This release of water reduces the amount of water
developed for the FAP’s beneficiaries and as such, impacts the overall cost-benefit ratio
for the project.^^
The FAP has created water flow problems on the other side of the Continental
Divide as well. Again, logic would suggest that increasing the amount of water in the
Arkansas via FAP collection facilities would positively impact the fishery. However,
resource managers now understand that the introduction of FAP water into the Arkansas
can both negatively and positively affect the fishery depending upon the rates and timing
o f the releases.^^
The year 1990 became a pivotal one in the management of the Arkansas River
thanks to the FAP. The release o f water from Ruedi Reservoir to aid endangered fish was
only one small component of the Bureau of Reclamation’s new management plan. Prior
to 1990 the Bureau of Reclamation released large amounts of water from FAP reservoirs
(Fort Collins, CO: Colorado Water Resources Research Institute, 1994), 107.
Finnell, Fryingpan-Arkansas, 59.
^ Department o f the Interior, Bureau o f Reclamation, “Annual Operating Plan, Fryingpan-Arkansas
Project, Water Year 2001 Operations” in U.S. Bureau o f Reclamation, “Annual Operating Plan, FryingpanArkansas Project, Water Year 2001 Operations,” n.d.,
< httn://w w w .usbr.gov/gp/aop/fa/01/0 1ooerations.htm#general> ( 17 April 2004); Southeastern Colorado
Water Conservancy District, “History and Description o f the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project,” n.d.,
<httn://w w w .secwcd.org/Historv%20and%20Descrinticn.htm> (7 April, 2004); see also Fennell,
Fryingpan-Arkansas, 59.
Smith and Hill, Arkansas River Needs Assessment, 3-57.
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along the Arkansas during the months o f May and June to meet the demands of irrigators.
The Bureau released minimal amounts o f water the rest of the year. This flow schedule
did considerable damage to the Arkansas River fishery, which requires certain minimum
flow levels year round. The new annual flow management program, implemented in
1990, allow the Bureau to maintain flows that support irrigation, wildlife and recreational
needs at various times of the year. This flow management program, sponsoring agencies
boast, better Mother Nature’s own schedule in maximizing benefits to those who rely on
the river for sustenance, profit and play.^^
The new flow schedule releases more water from upper reservoirs— Twin Lakes,
Clear Creek and Turquoise—to Pueblo Reservoir throughout the year. Releases during
the late-summer, autumn and winter months (Labor Day to the start o f spring runoff—
around April 15) better sustain fish populations all year round. Even greater summer
releases (typically July 15 to Labor Day) provide increased flows for kayaking, rafting
and angling. The Arkansas River between Buena Vista and Pueblo Reservoir is the most
extensively used recreation river in Colorado and one of the most used in the nation.
Summer releases of water increase the amount of evaporation that occurs (Pueblo
Reservoir stores water at a location lower in altitude and higher in temperatures than
exists in the upper reservoirs) and may hurt flat-water recreation in the upper reservoirs.
However, the agencies that manage the FAP deem these adverse impacts worth the cost,
considering benefits received.
Another ongoing and less-easily repaired problem involves the rerouting of water
along the Arkansas. In order to increase water flow to the Mt. Elbert Forebay Reservoir

Ibid., 1-11, 1-12.
Ibid., 1-11, 1-12, E-1.
85
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

for use in generating electricity at the Mt. Elbert Pumped-Storage Powerplant, FAP
facilities divert water from Lake Fork and Half Moon Creek—both tributaries of the
Arkansas River. The water diverted from these tributaries will, of course, eventually
return to the Arkansas River—but at a new point, miles downstream from the previous
confluence.^^
This re-routing o f water creates several environmental problems, particularly for
the area’s fish populations. First, these transfers reduce the amount of water available for
native trout populations between the points o f removal and return, thereby reducing their
numbers dramatically. Important spawning and nursery grounds for brown trout are also
compromised and even lost as a result o f this diversion. Second, the upper reaches of the
Arkansas River contain large amounts o f heavy metals that entered the river as mine
drainage from another tributary, California Gulch. Leadville, Colorado, located at the
headwaters of the Arkansas River, gained national reputation in the nineteenth century as
a silver and gold mining region. More recently it has been home to a molybdenum mine.
The lasting legacy from these mining activities, however, is toxic leftover. The area
surrounding Leadville receives federal dollars for clean-up as a Superfund site. This
toxic mine drainage has historically been diluted by Lake Fork and Half Moon Creek.
The removal o f water from these two tributaries has resulted in increased heavy metal
concentrations. Brown trout populations were either destroyed or significantly decreased
along a significant portion of the Arkansas headwaters as a result.^^
Yet another factor impacts fish along the FAP’s reservoirs and facilities; water
temperature changes. Water behind dams warms and evaporates at the surface.
Finnell, Fryingpan-Arkansas, 63; Thomas P. Nesler, The Fish Populations and Fishery o f the Upper
Arkansas River, 1977-1980 (Ft. Collins, Colorado Department o f Natural Resources, 1982), 24.
Nesler, Fish Populations, ii, 1, 23-4.
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However, deeper below the surface water temperatures are cooler than average; it is this
cooler water that dams release into streams. A 1983 environmental study of the
Fryingpan River concluded:
Due to the deep release o f water from the reservoir, mean monthly summer
temperatures in the river have decreased about 15 degrees Fahrenheit at the dam
site and 9 degrees Fahrenheit near Basalt compared to pre-dam records. Low
water temperatures in the spring... reduce the survival of rainbow trout eggs in
the upper two to three mile section of the river.^®
Ellen W ohl’s recent studies have shown that temperature changes, along with daminduced water level fluctuations and changes in oxygen levels to released water
profoundly influence the survivability, growth and reproduction of fish.^^
O f course there is another side to the debate. The same environmental study that
warns about the effects of colder water released from Ruedi Reservoir states that, in
general, the Fryingpan River is “good quality habitat for trout” on the fourteen-mile
segment of the river from Ruedi Dam to the river’s confluence with the Roaring Fork
River near Basalt.^® Furthermore, the Bureau of Reclamation claims:
Development of the Ruedi Dam and Reservoir has increased the available fish
habitat in the area, and the Fryingpan River immediately downstream from Ruedi
is known as a gold medal fishery. Operation of the dam has exposed about six
acres o f gravel, which now serve as a brown trout spawning ground, immediately
downstream from the dam. The gravel areas and regulated stream flow have
improved the fishery through increased natural reproduction and increased
recreation opportunities in the immediate area.^’
Such positive impacts on the environment are worthy of noting; they are few in number,
Simons, Li, and Associates, Inc., Fryingpan-Arkansas Project, Ruedi Reservoir, CO, Round 2 Water
Sale Environm ental Assessm ent
Collins, CO: Simons, Li and Associates, Inc., 1983), 3.13-3.16; see
also Finnell, Fryingpan-Arkansas, 15, 52.
Wohl, Virtual R ivers,l20; Sarah Bates, David Getches, Lawrence MacDonnell and Charles Wilkinson,
Searching Out the Headwaters: Change and R ediscovery in Western Water Policy (Washington, D.C.:
Island Press, 1993), 42-4, 140.
Simons, Li and Associates, Inc., Fryingpan-Arkansas, 3.13.
U.S. Bureau o f Reclamation, “Fryingpan-Arkansas Project,” n.d.,
< http : / / w w w .11 shr.aov/dataweb/html/fryark.html> (7 April 2004).
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however.
Dams, in general, create numerous negative consequences on the environment in
addition to those already mentioned. High runoff in the spring has a scouring effect upon
rivers. The increased flows of water remove sediments and other accumulated matter
from river banks. In other words, they clean the riverbed. Reservoirs, however, store
excessive spring water behind dams for use during other times of the year and to prevent
flooding in developed areas. At Ruedi Reservoir, the removal of this spring-scouring has
led to high algal buildup, which in turn, has led to lower productivity in natural food
organisms and aquatic invertebrates. Fish populations, of course, also decreased and
anglers noted their concerns as early as 1977.^^
The FAP’s dams create other stresses on aquatic organisms. For example, many
immature lake trout slip through the gates of the Mt. Elbert Conduit at Turquoise
Reservoir and end up at Mt. Elbert Forebay. The Mt. Elbert Powerplant’s turbines grind
many o f them up during power generation.

More troubling to a local ecosystem is its

transformation from a lotie (running-water) habitat to a lacustrine (still-water) habitat.
The FAP inundated over twenty miles o f Colorado streams, including over eleven miles
o f fair-to-excellent quality fisheries. Lacustrine habitats provide insufficient spawning
areas for native fish and reduce familiar food sources, such as plankton and benthos
populations.
Lacustrine habitats are also more appealing to anglers who come in increased
numbers and place higher pressures on the resource. Recreation pressures and habitat
changes have placed major stresses on native fish populations. The FAP’s Final EIS
Finnell, Fryingpan-Arkansas, 52-3, 56.
Ibid., 61-2.
Bureau o f Reclamation, Final EIS, IV-34-5.
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estimated that the project’s reservoirs would require approximately 72.9 tons of hatcheryreared fish for stocking—many o f which would have to be lacustrine types, such as lake
trout, kokanee salmon and smelt.^^

Terrestrial Impacts
The 2000 Arkansas River Water Needs Assessment discussed the importance of
riparian habitats to the local ecosystem at considerable length. This report states:
Riparian and wetland areas have been well-documented as the most productive
and attractive o f all wildlife habitats. Riparian communities have an importance
to fish, wildlife and recreation which is greatly disproportionate to the acreage of
these areas. Although less than 1 percent of the landscape is riparian vegetation,
greater than 80 percent o f breeding bird species occurs in this vegetation type in
the central Rocky Mountains. Riparian areas often provide the key resources that
support biological diversity both in the riparian area and nearby uplands.
When disruptions occur to these riparian habitats, like those created by the FAP,
reverberations are felt throughout the ecosystem. “Riparian and wetland areas,” the report
continues,
are critical for water-dependent terrestrial wildlife species and provide important
corridors for movement of wildlife. The linear nature of riparian ecosystems
provides distinct corridors important as migration and dispersal routes and as
forested connectors between habitats for wildlife sueh as birds, bats, deer, elk, and
small mammals.^^
The benefits and costs o f the 1990 flow management schedule on riparian
vegetation and habitat are difficult to ascertain. Although it would appear that higher
year-round flows would positively impact the riparian landscape, water managers
concede that positive or negative impacts on various riparian areas change according to a
broad spectrum of factors including soil moisture, bank erosion rates, and water table
Ibid., IV-34-5.
Smith and Hill, Arkansas River Needs Assessm ent, 5-16-17
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levels. ‘An action perceived to enhance vegetation” the Needs Assessment warns with
regard to manipulating flow patterns, “could erode stream banks and ultimately limit the
vegetation extent.”^^ It is impossible, in other words, to control the loss or gain to a
riparian zone along the river given our current understanding of the ecosystem.
Nevertheless, the Needs Assessment points out many ways that the FryingpanArkansas Project impacts the surrounding habitat. The FAP’s reservoirs and other
facilities disrupt terrestrial flora and fauna. Grazing and farming lands, as well as
wildemess-quality lands, now lie under water or house project buildings, transfer stations,
pipelines, canals or any number o f other project facilities. New roads— over sixty-two
miles worth o f them created during construction—disrupt migration patterns, erode soils
and create access for hunters and other recreational users who place increased strain on
the environment. The disturbed terrain over buried pipelines often requires years of
intensive rehabilitation in order to return to productive use. Disturbed soils remain
susceptible to invasion from o f non-native species of flora which can delay the return of
native species of plants and animals indefinitely. Meanwhile, the FAP’s Final EIS
reported major geological problems at Ruedi Reservoir shortly after its completion:
Slumping and sloughing has developed along the shoreline of Gyp Hill at Ruedi
Reservoir. Wave action and annual fluctuation of the water level of Ruedi
Reservoir has flushed out the backfill of ancient, filled sinkholes. These solution
cavities have since collapsed, giving the area an anaesthetic appearance. The area
also presents a safety hazard in its present state and access to the area by general
public is discouraged.^®
The FAP removed an estimated 17,300 acres of rangeland on both sides of the
Continental Divide from use; it has similarly removed nearly 1,000 acres of irrigated
croplands. It has permanently removed more than 5,000 acres of habitat for terrestrial.
Ibid., 5-23.
3* Bureau o f Reclamation, Final EIS, VI-6.
90
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

subterranean and avian species. The displacement of 25,000 ducks from the Pueblo
Reservoir area has been discussed previously.
Various species of wildlife react differently to disturbances along riparian
habitats. Some birds will abandon nesting sites. Changes in the availability of food may
weaken other species to the point of extinction. The amount, velocity and quality of
water in a river all effect species populations in different ways. Winter water flows are
important to Canada geese, for example, because they impact the availability o f aquatic
vegetation, terrestrial grasses, forbs, grains, stems, leaves, fruits, flowers, and insects.
Wood ducks, on the other hand, return every year to the same location and nest in large
trees—primarily cottonwoods. Herons and other species of birds, too, rely on large
cottonwoods for nesting. Cottonwood growth, however, is dependent on periodic
flooding, which has been virtually eliminated as a result o f the FAP.'*®
Threatened or endangered species that inhabit the riparian zones along the
Arkansas and Colorado Rivers include bald eagles, peregrine falcons and Mexican
spotted owls. All may be negatively impacted by changes along these rivers. Other
species that could be impacted by significant changes to riparian habitats—particularly
human disturbance, changes in water quality and quantity, and changes in riparian
vegetation— include American dippers, osprey, bighorn sheep, woodhouse toads, and
painted turtles.'^^
The exact impact that the FAP has had on riparian habitats is impossible to
discern. However, the Needs Assessment concludes:
Riparian and wetland resources in the region... have been greatly modified. A
Ibid., IV-26, IV-31.
Smith and Hill, Arkansas River Needs Assessment, 5-1, 5-17, 5-18, 5-19, 5-20.
Ibid., 5-1, 5-17, 5-18, 5-19, 5-20.
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century of road, railway, and dam construction, irrigation, conversion of land to
agriculture, urban development and other modifications have transformed riparian
resources.
The FAP is no small contributor to this transformation.

Conclusion
The use o f FAP facilities to manage river flows has maximized benefits to
irrigators, municipal and industrial entities and recreational users. It has also reduced
some o f the adverse environmental effects caused by its reservoirs, tunnels and related
facilities. Nevertheless, the impact of these facilities on the local environment has been
devastating. Changes in chemical composition, water flows and water temperature have
negatively impacted both aquatic and terrestrial species of flora and fauna. The
inundation o f land by reservoirs and the construction of roads, pipelines and other
facilities have disturbed wildlife corridors as well as nesting and feeding grounds.
The Bureau of Reclamation spent little time investigating this link between
hydrology and ecology—the interconnectedness of a river and its surrounding habitat—
when Congress began discussing the FAP in the 1950s and 1960s. But this oversight
changed in the late 1960s and early 1970s as Americans became more aware of the
environmental problems that came with water development projects and showed an
increased willingness to prevent or correct these problems."*^
This larger study of the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project has been written, in part, to
answer an important question that concerns the American West today: What does the
For an excellent discussion o f the rise o f m odem environmentalism and the “environmental revolution o f
the late 1960s and 1970s, see Mark H arvey's/I Sym bol o f Wilderness: Echo Park and the American
Conservation Movement, Roderick Nash’s Wilderness and the American Mind, and Michael M cCloskey’s
“W ilderness Movement at the Crossroads, 1945-1970” in the Pacific H istorical Review (August, 1972
issue).
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FAP tell us about our potential to develop similar water development projects in the
future? This chapter fills in what has been a missing piece of the puzzle in determining
costs and benefits for the FAP. The costs of the FAP on the environmental are
substantial enough to ward off consideration of similar projects in the future.

93
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Conclusion
When Congress approved the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project in 1962 Americans did
not fully understand all of the costs involved in building and maintaining reclamation
projects o f its size and complexity. They did, however, understand that certain costs
existed and felt that they were acceptable in light of the benefits the project provided for
cities, industries and agricultural users. Despite the controversy that erupted over the
diversion o f water from the Western Slope to the Eastern Slope, the majority of
Coloradoans felt that their interests were adequately protected by the finalized project.
A look at the debate over the FAP during the 1950s and early 1960s reveals a
remarkable picture o f our nation’s history. The Cold War dominated American life at the
time and Congressmen felt obligated to ensure that military instillations like the Pueblo
Ordnance Depot, and industries deemed critical to our national defense, like Colorado
Fuel and Iron, received the water they needed to operate. A severe drought during the
1950s added to their concerns. Meanwhile, environmental groups such as the Wilderness
Society and the Sierra Club began debating whether they should expand their focus
beyond National Parks and pristine wilderness areas to advocate for general
environmental protections. By the 1960s, the environmental movement would emerge in
the form we know it today.
Economically, the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project has been plagued by the same
concerns that gave reclamation a bad name elsewhere in the West: federal subsidies,
poorly-calculated cost-benefit ratios and unequal distribution o f benefits. The
Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District, the agency responsible for
repayment o f many of the project’s facilities, received a final bill for roughly $132
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million. The project’s actual costs, though difficult to estimate, were at least $485
million. Federal taxpayers made up the difference. Below-market interest rates on the
$132 million debt equate to additional subsidies for the SCWCD at taxpayer expense.
Colorado citizens are hit particularly hard by the costs of the FAP. Property taxes
collected from Coloradoans living in the district’s boundaries pay for nearly 80% of the
project’s costs. Yet most of these residents receive few if any of the benefits created by
the FAP. Although the FAP’s Operating Principles guarantee cities and industries 51%
o f the water reclaimed by the project, irrigators, up until the last couple of years,
received, on average, 77% of the project’s water. El Paso County, home to Colorado
Springs, receives, on average, only 23% o f the FAP’s allocation of water; yet its residents
contribute roughly 74% of the property tax revenues used by the SCWCD toward its
financial obligation.
Part o f the reason cities did not receive their full allocation of water in past years
was their lack of ability to transport the water. This problem may be remedied in the
future if state and federal agencies approve projects like Colorado Springs’ proposed
Southern Delivery System (SDS). The SDS would construct new reservoirs along the
Arkansas, would enlarge the storage capacity o f existing FAP facilities at Pueblo, Twin
Lakes and Turquoise Reservoirs, and, most importantly, would construct a delivery
pipeline between Colorado Springs and the Arkansas River.
For now, irrigators in the Arkansas Valley benefit the most from the existing
arrangement. They pay a fraction of the actual costs of the water they receive from the
FAP. Still, the FAP cannot meet even their needs every year. In particularly dry years,
the supply o f water does not come close to meeting the demand. On the other hand, in
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wet or normal years of precipitation, large amounts of “native” Arkansas water flushes
down the river unused. Moderating these feasts and famines may require enlarging
existing reservoirs or building new ones—the approach called for in the SDS. However,
the cost o f this approach may be considerable, especially to the local environment.
After the passage o f the FAP in 1962, a new environmental sensitivity emerged in
America’s consciousness. Cold War fears morphed into fears over the survival of
endangered fish speeies and the preservation of riparian habitats. Similarly, recreation,
with its emphasis on natural, raw beauty, emerged as a more powerful industry in
Colorado than agriculture and steel. Greater concern for the environment surfaced, in
part, because new scientific methods allow us to measure environmental ehanges more
aecurately than ever before.
Amerieans in 1962 had little knowledge about the consequences that the FAP
would have on the environment. Since that time, however, we have discovered better
means by which to measure environmental changes in the rivers and ecosystems caused
by the project. Fish and other aquatic organisms have been negatively impacted by the
FAP for a variety o f reasons. The FAP increased levels of salinity in the water, changed
water temperatures in dams and rivers downstream from them, slowed water to a
standstill in some areas, and removed it from other locations altogether. These conditions
similarly affected terrestrial habitats surrounding the rivers and the flora and fauna that
dwell in them. Micromanagement o f the Arkansas River by state and federal agencies
has alleviated some o f these concerns in that basin, but not all of them.
Salinity has emerged as the most pressing environmental issue raised by the FAP.
Farmers along the Colorado River and Arkansas River basins have seen their productivity
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reduced because o f salinity increases in their irrigation water. Ten percent or more o f the
Arkansas Valley s farmable acres are out of production because of increases in salinity
caused, in part, by the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project.
Neither Donald Worster’s nor Donald Pisani’s interpretation of water history in
the West adequately explain the passage o f the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project and the
distribution o f its costs and benefits. However, both historians provide facts and analyses
that helped shape the final conclusions presented in this thesis. The government and
wealthy elites did not monopolize the process of planning and passing the project, as
Worster contends happened elsewhere in the West. Diverse Colorado interests— from the
Salida Chamber of Commerce to Pueblo Trades and Labor Assembly—approved of the
project, and many o f them helped shape the FAP from the very beginning. Most
Coloradoans viewed water development as a way to maintain economic growth. The
Bureau o f Reclamation, the federal bureaucracy and the wealthy agricultural “elites”
were more than happy to endorse and lead the process. However, the FAP is not their
baby alone. The project’s history, then, in alignment with Donald Pisani’s interpretation,
is one important “fragment” of water policy in the West.
On the other hand, Donald Worster’s conclusion that an agricultural “elite”
received most of the benefits of reclamation in the West—subsidies in the form of cheap
water, paid for with federal tax dollars— concur with the findings presented in this thesis.
However, the agricultural “elite” in the Arkansas Valley, with average holdings of just
over 1,200 acres, do not at all resemble the wealthy “elite” addressed by Worster in
Rivers o f Empire. The holdings of Arkansas Valley farmers are minuscule when
compared to those held by giant California agribusinesses like Chevron USA or the Tejon
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Ranch— 35,000 acres or more. Similarly, Worster’s contention that reclamation projects
in the West have substantially altered and harmed the environment is supported by
documents on the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project. The contributions made by both Worster
and Pisani to this examination of the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project are significant.
However, the conclusions reached in this thesis are unique and add new depth to the
historiography.
This thesis has examined the political, economic and environmental history of the
Fryingpan-Arkansas Project. The FAP is an inefficient system, financed by inefficient
methods. However, it benefits numerous Coloradoans in numerous ways. Water
concerns will only worsen as time goes on. Those involved in planning and approving
projects like Colorado Springs’ SDS should study the FAP closely before making policy
decisions. It is critical that we examine our history of water development in order to
make better decisions about future development.
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